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ESSAY
Law School Examinations
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay explores the values, limits, and adverse effects of our
system of law school examinations. Law school examinations encourage
or require students to acquire certain knowledge while measuring a
kind of knowledge as well. Importantly, this process occurs within a
context of political relationships between law schools, law firms, the le-
gal profession, and the state, as well as between law school administra-
tors, faculty, and students. This system of "power/knowledge"
relationships constitutes the law school's basic mechanism of self-regu-
lation or, more generally, a mechanism of social control over legal edu-
cation.2 In this era of substantial uncertainty about purposes and
methods in legal education,3 an inquiry into law school examinations
and their political contexts is both timely and potentially fruitful.
Prior studies have developed important criticisms of law school ex-
aminations, but these studies have been partial or limited critiques.4
2. On the need to analyze knowledge systems in the context of their political relationships,
see M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (A. Sheridan trans. 1977)
[hereinafter ML FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE] and i FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLnDG&'
SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITING 1972-1977 (C. Gordon trans. 1980) [hereinafter M. Fou-
CAULT, Two Lectures].
3. See, e.g., Kissam, The Decline of Law School Professionalism, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 251
(1986); Levinson, Professing Law: Commitment of Faith or Detached Analysis?, 31 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 3 (1986).
4. See Coutts, Examinations for Law Degrees, 9 J. Soc'Y PuB. TCHRS. L. 399 (1967); Cram-
ton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 328-30 (1982); Feinman &
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These studies have uncritically accepted conventional beliefs about law
school practices and have overlooked certain values and disadvantages
of the current examination system. This Essay provides a "systemic
analysis" and a "total critique" by assessing the structure, contextual
relationships, values, and adverse effects of law school examinations. 5
This Essay seeks to improve our understanding of law school exams
in three basic ways. First, Part II presents a new interpretation of what
the modern law school examination requires and measures of student
performance. This interpretation emphasizes the reading and grading
methods that are used by most contemporary law professors, the impli-
cations of these methods for the thought and writing style of examina-
tion writers, and the personal attributes that are required for
examination success. Second, Parts III, IV, and V consider the law
school examination in context in order to assess the values, limits, and
disadvantages of the examination system. This analysis focuses initially
on relationships of law school exams with student admissions and
faculty recruitment policies, with state licensure exams, and with law
firm hiring practices. The analysis also considers the apparent disjunc-
tions between classroom and examination work, the reasons for these
disjunctions, and how these disjunctions serve the examination system
and social interests. This analysis also discusses the several ways that
examination practices influence the lives and work of students and
faculty. Third, Part VI describes changes to our examination practices
that could improve the quality of legal education without jeopardizing
the main values of the present system.
This study reaches five major conclusions. First, the current exami-
nation system tests for several complex attributes. These attributes in-
clude the ability to internalize legal doctrine; the skill of "issue
spotting" or, more precisely, "legal imagination"; and a "legal produc-
tivity" that is demonstrated by quickness and effectiveness at issue
spotting, the specification of rules, and the application of rules to com-
plex situations. Law school exams also test a person's capacity for self-
study and self-learning in diffuse, complex, and uncertain situations
over sustained periods of time. These attributes, especially the talents
Feldman, Achieving Excellence: Mastery Learning in Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 528,
545-47 (1985); Motley, A Foolish Consistency: The Law School Exam, 10 NovA L.J. 723 (1986);
Nickles, Examining and Grading in American Law Schools, 30 ARK. L. REv. 411 (1977); Rickson,
Faculty Control and the Structure of Student Competition: An Analysis of the Law Student
Role, 25 J. LEGAL EDuc. 47 (1973); Wood, The Measurement of Law School Work (pts. 1-3), 24
COLUM. L. REv. 224 (1924) [hereinafter Wood (pt. 1)], 25 COLUML L. REv. 316 (1925) [hereinafter
Wood (pt. 2)], 27 COLUM. L. Rv. 784 (1927) [hereinafter Wood (pt. 3)].
5. On the sociological concept of "systemic analysis," see M. JANowiTz, THE LAST HALF CEN-
TURY 53-81 (1978). On the philosophical concept of "total critique," see R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE &
POLMCS 1-3 (1975).
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of productivity and self-learning, are clearly important to the practice
of law, and most employers, especially large corporate firms, presuma-
bly are quite interested in hiring lawyers who possess these qualities.
Second, the immediate function of law school grading practices is
to establish a highly disaggregated class ranking system. This system is
an efficient device, or at least a rational one, for sorting students in
ways that serve the hiring purposes of many law firms. This system
screens prospective employees for those employers who place a substan-
tial premium on an individual's promise of productivity and self-learn-
ing. These employers most likely are the larger corporate law firms,
which can provide specific on-the-job training for new associates and
can more easily absorb or compensate for mistakes that are made in the
training and hiring of new lawyers.
Third, while serving the recruitment interests of many firms, the
examination system also promotes the learning of certain basic skills
and doctrine. This process prepares students to take state licensure ex-
ams, which are modeled on the law school examination. In addition, the
examination process encourages law students to acquire relatively ex-
tensive legal vocabularies that undoubtedly can benefit their initial
practices.
Fourth, at the same time, the examination system has adverse ef-
fects that are not commonly recognized. The system's pervasive com-
mitment to excessive objectivity (or objectivism) in writing, reading,
and evaluating examination papers has adverse, if unintended, effects
on teaching and learning practices, on the writing and thinking styles of
future lawyers, and on a "law school philosophy" that unfortunately be-
comes the theory of law for many lawyers.
The objectivism of law school examinations allows professors to
limit their engagement with both the teaching and evaluation of their
students. The marked discontinuities between classroom work and ex-
amination work and the use of quantitative methods to read and grade
law school examinations are the primary means by which professors
achieve this disengagement. In addition, the use of grading curves with
many gradations discourages law professors from providing much in-
struction or effective feedback to students on their performance of basic
examination skills, for to provide this guidance would make it more dif-
ficult to impose such a grading curve. In sum, this disengagement frees
law professors to pursue their nonteaching interests as scholars, consul-
tants, or professional experts without giving much consideration to the
provision of effective and democratic legal education. This disengage-
ment also leaves law students largely without guidance in their at-
tempts to acquire basic skills and doctrine. While this method helps to
test the students' capacities for self-study and self-learning, it also re-
[Vol. 42:433
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sults in poor education.
The severe time constraints on law school examinations, which test
for productivity and help to generate grading curves with many grada-
tions, also promote a paradigm of examination thinking and writing
that I call "good paragraph thinking." This paradigm undoubtedly re-
flects some valuable intellectual skills, but as a paradigm of thought
and writing this model has significant adverse effects on legal thought,
legal writing, and legal practice. In essence, the paradigm of good para-
graph thinking works for law school examinations, but it is too reduc-
tionist and too fragmentary to serve the varied intellectual demands of
most legal practices.
The examination process also encourages thinking about law as the
mere description of rules or facts. This mentality can help to generate
many correct answers on law school exams, but it misrepresents the
more complex processes of description, interpretation, evaluation, and
prescription that characterize legal practice.'
Fifth, the adverse effects of the current examination system may be
unnecessary. As proposed in Part VI, changes could be made to our
teaching and examination practices to ameliorate these adverse effects
at relatively low costs to law professors, law schools, and the major val-
ues of the current system. If such changes are possible, the current sys-
tem should be reformed, primarily by developing and implementing
certain preclinical or quasi-clinical methods for teaching and evaluating
students in our basic law school courses.
II. THE EXAMINATION
This Part describes the nature of law school examinations and the
reading, interpretation, and grading of these exams. This inquiry
reveals the basic examination structure and the personal attributes that
are necessary to succeed on law school exams. These insights set the
stage for a subsequent look at the complex relationships between law
school exams and their educational, social, and personal contexts.
A. Definition
In this Essay the term "Blue Book" refers to any end-of-the-semes-
ter examination that counts for most or all of a student's grade and
lasts no longer than a standard working day of eight to ten hours. This
6. On the argumentative and interpretive aspects of legal practice, see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter R. DWORKIN]. On the thrust of law school training towards thinking
about law as the mere description of fact, see R DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 38 (1977)
[hereinafter . DWORKIN, SERIOUSLY] and N. SIMMONDS, CENTRAL ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE 1-5
(1986).
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concept includes a variety of forms, which can range from one- or two-
hour short-answer exams to so-called take-home exams that last five,
eight, or ten hours. Such examinations typically are used to evaluate
law students in courses devoted to the study of legal doctrine.' In law
school clinics, simulated clinical courses, and seminars, other exercises
are used to evaluate a student's performance, and there is a limited use
of take-home examinations that last for longer periods of time.8 Gener-
ally, however, the multihour Blue Book exam is used as the law school
examination.
B. Form and Content
Blue Book exams notoriously impose severe time constraints on
student performance. In other words, these exams usually have a short
duration relative to the work demanded, and virtually all students must
work continuously throughout the examination period in order to
achieve the best possible scores." Although some faculty members pro-
fess desires to avoid imposing time pressure on their students, a tradi-
tional rationale exists for imposing substantial time constraints on Blue
Book exams. Time constraints, it is believed, are necessary if one is to
test comprehensively while limiting the number of words that a faculty
member must read."0 Many commentators also deem time constraints
necessary to provide a "fair" distribution of grades between students"
and to differentiate between "the good student and the very good stu-
dent. ' 12 Thus, the concept of a time constraint is the most widely
shared characteristic of law school exams, and it is, as will be seen later,
an important aspect of both the values and adverse effects of these
exams.
While the concept of a time constraint is common in law school
exams, the form of Blue Book questions and answers is more variable.
Many different examination problems are used, including the classic
"issue spotter" essay question; advocacy-oriented questions that invite
a more deliberate construction of complex arguments; various sorts of
7. See Nickles, supra note 4, at 432-36.
8. See Kissam, Thinking (By Writing) About Legal Writing, 40 VAND. L. REv. 135, 158-63
(1987).
9. See Bell, Law School Exams and Minority-Group Students, 7 BLACK L.J. 304, 305 (1981-
82); Motley, supra note 4, at 736-37; see also Duke, Rules for Success in Teaching and Examining,
11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 386 (1959). The Duke article provides the following maxim: "Be certain that a
four-hour examination cannot humanly be completed in less than six. Good lawyers must be able
to work under pressure." Id.
10. See Nickles, supra note 4, at 451.
11. See id. at 452.
12. See Oliphant, A Sample of the New Type of Law Examinations, 6 AM. L. SCH. REv. 490,
491 (1929).
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short-answer questions that test for issue identification, rules specifica-
tion, or rule application; and questions that ask students to evaluate
different aspects of legal doctrine.1 s Various examination answers may
be required including essay answers, short essays, short answers, or
true-false and multiple-choice answers to so-called objective
questions.1
The content of Blue Book exams, especially in first-year law
courses, is characterized by an almost exclusive focus on the application
of judicial doctrine to provide resolutions of hypothetical legal dis-
putes.15 This result is understandable because the ordinary law school
curriculum concentrates on the study of judicial doctrine. An important
distinction exists, however, between the legal doctrine of the classroom
and the legal doctrine that is employed on law school exams. Although
there are some connections between these different uses of doctrine,
these connections are neither close nor easily identifiable.
In casebooks and in the classroom, the study of law typically fo-
cuses on judicial decisions in "pivotal" or "test" cases in which an ap-
pellate court has established or recognized an important legal
doctrine.1 Casebooks also may provide "deviant" judicial decisions that
are subject to legal criticism or evaluation. Classroom work, we might
say, is primarily concerned with the analysis of pivotal or test cases and
the use of basic legal theory to understand, interpret, and evaluate legal
doctrine.
On Blue Book exams, however, the student typically is expected to
employ legal doctrine taught throughout the course to resolve or argue
about "borderline" cases that tend to sit, as David Chambers has put it,
"in nervous juxtaposition between the situations in cases discussed in
class."1" Thus, Blue Book work calls for the use of a lawyer's conven-
13. See Nickles, supra note 4, at 433 nn.69-70.
14. See Atkinson, The Use of True-False Examinations in Law Schools, 6 AM. L. SCH. REv.
702 (1929).
15. See Bell, supra note 9, at 305; Chambers, The First-Year Courses: What's There and
What's Not, in LOOKING AT LAW SCHOOL: A STUDENT GUIDE FROM THE SOCIETY OF AMERICAN LAW
TEACHERS 39, 41 (S. Gillers ed. 1977) [hereinafter S. GILLERs]; Younger, Examinations, in S. GIL-
LERS, supra, at 145. But cf. Macdonald, Curricular Development in the 1980s: A Perspective, 32 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 569, 570 (1982) (claiming that in the 1980s "[tihe litigation hypothetical set in the
context of adversarial adjudication no longer dominates classroom and examination").
16. On the distinction between test cases, in which lawyers argue about what doctrine is or
should be, and borderline cases, in which lawyers contest the application of agreed-upon tests or
rules, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 39-43.
17. Cf. Macaulay, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors II: Some Notes on Two
Recent Studies of the Chicago Bar, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506, 514 (1982) (noting that "[m]ost law
professors have few heroes on the bench, and their classes are devoted to scoring points off appel-
late opinions").
18. Chambers, supra note 15, at 41.
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tional methods of reasoning to apply recognized doctrine to borderline
cases.19 There is, then, a marked discontinuity between the content of
classroom work and the content of examination work in most law school
courses.
C. Functions and Style
Blue Book exams generally require students to perform three or
four intellectual functions. These exams also reward a particular style
of thinking and writing that helps students perform these functions in a
successful manner. In law schools these functions, and the style re-
quired to perform them, frequently are referred to rather loosely as
"analysis" or "legal analysis."
The first of these examination functions is issue spotting or, more
precisely, perceiving analogies between the stated facts of an examina-
tion problem and professionally recognized legal issues, standards, and
precedents. This perception of analogies is necessary to characterize the
aspects of a situation for the purposes of conventional legal reasoning.
In philosophical or psychological terms, we might say that this function
calls for the exercise of a skill in conventional "legal imagination," be-
cause this function, like the philosophical concept of imagination, re-
quires one to perceive connections between general standards and
particular instances.20 This notion of legal imagination, unlike the more
prosaic term "issue spotting," helps to emphasize the artistic and prac-
tical dimensions of this examination function. The term "issue spot-
ting," by contrast, connotes some sort of scientific process, which this
function definitely is not, at least as it is practiced on time-limited Blue
Book exams.2 '
The second examination function requires the identification of rel-
evant legal authorities or, in other words, a specification of legal rules
and other relevant facts or holdings of precedents. This specification of
authority also may include recognizing "policies" and "principles," es-
pecially if these latter concepts constitute the purposes behind concrete
legal authority and can be used to argue for particular applications of
legal rules and holdings in hard cases.22
The third examination function requires the application of legal
19. See, e.g., Younger, supra note 15. For specification of the conventional methods of legal
reasoning, see S. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING (1985).
20. On this philosophical concept of imagination, see P. STRAWSON, Imagination and Percep-
tion, in FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT 45 (1974).
21. Cf. Kissam, supra note 3, at 260-61 (comparing the typical law school exam to "a jigsaw
puzzle that can never be completed").
22. On the functions of principles and policies in legal argument and interpretation, see R.
DWORKIN, SERIOUSLY, supra note 6, at 14-45, 81-130.
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authorities to complex fact situations. As mentioned above, this process
is often referred to as "analysis," but the more basic notion of "rule
application" is probably a more accurate description of this intellectual
function. The application of legal authority to a given situation can in-
volve: (1) a straightforward integration or synthesis of a rule's complex
elements to various facts; (2) the perception of ambiguity in the appli-
cation of a general standard to specific facts, which allows for the con-
struction of competing arguments about application of the rule; (3) the
perception of ambiguous or contradictory facts, which also allows for
constructing competing arguments; (4) the use of analogous fact situa-
tions in precedents to argue for a particular application of a general
standard; and (5) the demonstration that a rule's purpose would be
served by a particular application of the rule to the facts.23
This rule application function can incorporate a significant amount
of issue spotting, although the issue spotting involved at this juncture is
more specific and more concrete than the initial issue spotting that
serves to begin the analysis. The rule application function also may re-
quire the ability to recall and state specific elements of relevant legal
rules and precedents with considerable precision, and this process often
requires more specificity and concreteness than the mere identification
of legal authority that may satisfy the rule specification function.
These three examination functions thus have overlapping charac-
teristics, but it is the rule application function that typically calls for
the greatest precision and organization in specifying relevant legal au-
thorities and employing them in problem solving. We might say, then,
that the rule application function places the greatest demands on law
students for demonstrating the skills of legal imagination and legal pro-
ductivity, which are evidenced by the effective application of rules to
facts under substantial time constraints.
Some Blue Book exams require students to perform evaluative
functions in applying certain external standards to help resolve particu-
lar legal disputes. These evaluative functions may include determining
"the right answer" or "a good answer" in accordance with a consensus
professional opinion; employing generally recognized or innovative pol-
icy arguments or principles to construct arguments for particular par-
ties in "pivotal cases," in other words, cases involving issues of first
impression, conflicting rules, or disputes with precedent; and employing
principles, policy arguments, and more general doctrinal standards to
evaluate and criticize particular legal authorities. Blue Book exams,
however, are not likely to require these evaluative functions as often as
23. See Bell, supra note 9, at 311-12; Vold, Types of Essay Law Examination An-
swers-Good and Bad, 3 HASTINGS L.J. 85 (1951). See generally Younger, supra note 15.
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they require the first three examination functions. The controversy, un-
certainty, novelty, originality, and practical judgments that are involved
in both constructing and grading evaluative arguments lead most mod-
ern law professors to avoid such questions in order to ensure "objectiv-
ity" in grading.24
The literature on law school examinations suggests that Blue Books
at times may require and test for other functions such as the "organiza-
tion" or "control" of material,25 "synthesizing" or "integrational"
skills,26 "legal planning,"27 "constructive thought, ' 28 and, more gener-
ally, "writing ability. '29 1 doubt that these concepts represent indepen-
dent functions that are required or tested by many Blue Book exams
for several reasons. First, if we try to give specific content to these con-
cepts in the context of time-limited exams, our discussion is likely to
turn towards issue spotting, rule specification, and rule application, the
basic functions already identified. Second, the form and content of
most Blue Book exams suggest that these three basic functions proba-
bly exhaust the universe of common examination functions. Consider
the traditional emphasis on "issue spotter" exams, 0 and the substantial
and apparently increasing use of objective questions and other sorts of
short-answer questions.31 These phenomena certainly suggest a limited
set of examination functions. Third, the contemporary use of grading
curves, which require that many grade distinctions be recognized within
individual courses, also suggests that these more general functions
probably are not present or required frequently. As with evaluative
functions, it is difficult to make "quantitative" or "objective" measure-
ments of student performance of these functions; yet such measure-
ments seem necessary to implement grading curves with many
24. Cf. Coutts, supra note 4, at 402-03 (noting that law school examiners claim that they
want to test for "[a]nalysis, [s]ynthesis and [e]valuation," but that "educationalists have so far
told us comparatively little about" how to test for these functions as compared to "[k]nowledge,
[c]omprehension, [and] [alpplication").
25. See, e.g., A. VANDERBILT, LAW SCHOOL: BRIEFING FOR A LEGAL EDUCATION 98 (1981); Le-
vine, Toward Descriptive Grading, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 696, 703 (1971); Nickles, supra note 4, at 433
n.69; Younger, supra note 15, at 148.
26. See Coutts, supra note 4, at 402; Motley, supra note 4, at 725; Nickles, supra note 4, at
447.
27. See Macdonald, supra note 15, at 570.
28. See Atkinson, supra note 14, at 702.
29. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 9, at 311-12; Nickles, supra note 4, at 433 n.69; Younger, supra
note 15, at 148.
30. See S. TUROW, ONE L 187-96, 289-93 (1977) (describing first-year issue spotter exams at
Harvard Law School); A. VANDERBILT, supra note 25, at 97-98 (describing law school exams as issue
spotter exams).
31. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 277-78; Motley, supra note 4, at 724; Nickles, supra note 4,
at 434, 447-51. In 1945 a committee of the American Association of Law Schools endorsed the
increased use of short-answer objective questions on law school examinations. See id. at 448 n.122.
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gradations. Objectivity in grading is easier when students are tested
only on their performance of the three basic examination functions.2
The widespread belief among professors that Blue Book exams test
for integrational ability, constructive thought, and writing ability does
suggest a deeper truth about the style and content of Blue Book an-
swers. This belief may reflect an inchoate and ill-defined perception of
an implicit paradigm of successful Blue Book answers, a paradigm that
I refer to as "good paragraph thinking." This paradigm combines the
functions of issue spotting, rule specification, and rule application in a
logical way so that, at least in essay answers, a good answer may (and
usually does) consist of nothing more than a series of paragraphs in
which each paragraph identifies a specific issue or subissue, identifies
an appropriate authority in sufficiently precise terms, and applies this
authority to the problem, often showing how to arrive first at one result
and then the other.3 In this paradigm it is not necessary that the
paragraphs be well written as a formal matter, or that the paragraphs
be carefully or coherently related to each other, or that any paragraph
display sound practical judgment about which matters are more impor-
tant, or that any paragraph show how a conflict between competing ar-
guments might be resolved in a reasonable manner. Indeed, the best
evidence for these latter claims may be that the paradigm of good para-
graph thinking is equally useful in answering well-constructed short-an-
swer questions that test for the same qualities as Blue Book essay
questions. Nonetheless, the graders of Blue Book essays that are writ-
ten in the style of good paragraph thinking, especially those who grade
in a highly quantitative manner, are likely to believe that these essays
represent relatively successful constructive thought or writing ability.
These are the answers, after all, that appear to reflect our success as
teachers, and it would be surprising if law professors did not think that
successful Blue Book answers represent the many complex qualities of
successful legal thought.34
The paradigm of good paragraph thinking is not the only way in
which successful Blue Book answers might be constructed. This para-
32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The modern emphasis of law professors on
quantitative and objective grading methods is described in Part II D.
33. See A. VANDERBILT, supra note 25, at 97-98; Bell, supra note 9, at 311-12; Swisher,
Teaching Legal Reasoning in Law School: The University of Richmond Experience, 74 LAW LIBa.
J. 534, 539 (1981) (describing "good exam answers").
34. See Nickles, supra note 4, at 429 (reporting substantial law faculty agreement with the
proposition that law school grades are "significant[ly] correlat[ed]" with "success as a practi-
tioner"); cf. Coutts, supra note 4, at 403 (expressing astonishment at a report that "the majority of
law teachers . . . were clearly satisfied with the present range of examining techniques" despite
Professor Coutts's view of clear defects in law school examinations and numerous complaints by
law professors about various aspects of the examination process).
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digm, however, does describe the most common thinking/writing style
of contemporary law school exam writers. Certainly the few descriptions
of good examination answers reflect this paradigm.3 5 Further, this para-
digm is a logical approach to thinking about and writing effective exam-
ination answers under "quantifiable" or "objective" styles of grading
Blue Books, and these styles have become the prevailing method of
reading and grading Blue Book essays.
D. Grading Blue Book Exams
The methods of reading, interpreting, and grading Blue Books have
a critical if tacit bearing on the kinds of examination questions that are
asked, the ways in which student answers are interpreted, the qualities
that are measured and encouraged by Blue Book examinations, and
even the professor's goals and methods in teaching law school courses.
In recent decades the prevailing method of grading Blue Books appar-
ently has shifted from a practical, open-ended, and experience-based
method of reading and grading essay answers towards more quantita-
tive or objective grading methods. These quantitative methods are ap-
plied alike to essay answers, short answers, and true-false or multiple-
choice answers to objective questions. This shift has resulted from com-
plex causes and has important implications not only for the writing of
Blue Books but also for the basic quality of legal education. The causes
and implications of this shift deserve analysis to help us determine the
values, limits, and adverse consequences of the objective grading style
in particular and of law school exams in general.
Reading, interpreting, and evaluating essay answers can be con-
ducted in many different ways. Thus, this process must be the focus of
an analysis of grading Blue Book exams. True-false and multiple-choice
questions always have required answers that are demonstrably correct
on the basis of some accepted, explicit, or "objective" authority such as
a reported case or rule, a teacher's statement in class, or perhaps a
statement in some legal treatise. Other short answers, and probably
short essays as well, also typically require this kind of correct answer
because there usually is only one idea or one set of ideas-an issue, a
rule, or a brief application of a rule to facts-that a faculty member
should accept as a correct answer to these questions. Complex Blue
Book problems that require lengthy essay answers, however, also can be
graded on this "objective" basis. The faculty reader may evaluate es-
says by giving credit only for statements of specific elements of a
"model answer" that can be demonstrated as the correct answer on the
35. See A. VANDFBILT, supra note 25, at 97-98; Bell, supra note 9, at 311-12; Younger, supra
note 15.
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basis of some accepted or explicit authority. Typically, the specific ele-
ments of this right answer will consist of issues that should be identi-
fied, the rules that should be specified, and the standard application of
these rules to the given facts. 6 Of course, this approach is not the only
way that one may read and evaluate Blue Book essays, but it is cer-
tainly a logical way to read and evaluate answers to the classic issue
spotter essay exam. In addition, our modern concerns about objectivity,
neutrality, and impersonality in grading exams and our contemporary
use of "model answers," "answer keys," and "score sheets" to demon-
strate the grading process to our students3 7 suggest that today the ob-
jective grading model is employed pervasively in evaluating Blue Book
essays.
There is little direct evidence of how law professors actually evalu-
ate examination answers; this fact alone may suggest some troublesome
aspects of professional power. The literature suggests, however, that in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries law school examina-
tions were graded on an official A-B-C-D-F scale, with most grades in
the A, B, and C categories.3 ' Further, I suspect that in the past many
Blue Book essays were read and graded under a general or holistic ap-
proach that gave considerable emphasis to a professor's practical judg-
ment about the professional promise indicated by different student
answers. Under this approach, the professor would make some overall
judgment about what each answer demonstrated of the student's gen-
eral understanding, inferential abilities, analytical abilities, and practi-
cal judgment concerning particular legal problems. This judgment, of
course, was grounded in the professor's professional experience with le-
gal problems of the same sort and in her reading of many similar exam-
ination papers. These judgments were translated into categories of very
good or excellent, good, satisfactory, and less than satisfactory. These
categories then were expressed symbolically by A, B, and C grades for
the three groups of satisfactory papers, and Ds and Fs for less than
satisfactory papers.
Significantly, this grading style allowed professors to assess their
students' abilities at issue spotting, rule specification, and rule applica-
tion while taking account of other skills as well. Other skills considered
might have included the sound or imaginative interpretation of events
and authorities; the demonstration of practical reason, judgment, and
innovation in developing and reconciling competing arguments or mak-
36. See Doubles, Law School Examinations, 8 Ax L. ScH. REv. 254 (1935).
37. See id. at 258; Kissam, supra note 3, at 277; Motley, supra note 4, at 750-51.
38. See Grant, The Single Standard in Grading, 29 COLUM L. REv. 920, 921-22 (1929)
(describing Columbia's grading practices in the 1920s); see also Nickles, supra note 4, at 471 (re-
porting a similar situation at most law schools in 1975-76).
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ing decisions; and the employment of rhetoric in forming well-con-
structed and persuasive arguments. 9 I shall call this holistic method
the "Aristotelian model" of grading because of its capacity to take ac-
count of the skills of interpretation, conventional and creative imagina-
tion, practical reason, and practical judgment, all of which are
associated with Aristotle's philosophy of ethical or normative
decisionmaking. 40
The Aristotelian model seems to be a sensible way of evaluating the
professional promise of law students on the basis of their written work,
especially if the model includes (as it did not in the past) explicit quali-
tative standards to differentiate between grades. This method of read-
ing and evaluation approximates many professional tasks: for example,
the manner in which partners are likely to read draft memoranda and
briefs of associates and the manner in which judges are likely to read
the briefs of advocates. Importantly, this model allows faculty members
to write many different kinds of examination questions; thus, the model
could support pluralistic teaching methods and a greater variety of sub-
stantive emphases in law school courses."' In addition, the model en-
courages faculty members to read and interpret Blue Book essays in a
way that is consistent with generally accepted interpretive and critical
practices. This method, unlike the objective grading style, invites
professors to interpret and criticize student essays in the manner that
we naturally employ to interpret and criticize works of art, social prac-
tices, and legal authorities-that is, first construing the work in a sym-
pathetic way that provides the best possible interpretation of the work
and then criticizing the work under explicit standards that pertain to a
work of its kind.42 Sympathetic readings of essays are possible under
the objective model of grading, but the piecemeal and fragmented na-
ture of this method-as one searches for the many specific elements to
a "right answer"-diminishes the likelihood of sympathetic interpreta-
tion. The objective model is more likely to produce unnatural interpre-
tations, as professors read student essays in a negative state of mind in
order to produce the many quantitative distinctions that are inherent in
39. See Wood (pt. 1), supra note 4, at 226-34; see also supra notes 25-29 and accompanying
text (reporting that earlier generations of law professors believed that they were testing for such
open-ended legal values, which implies that these professors were employing holistic grading
methods).
40. On the application of Aristotle's concepts of practical reason and judgment to the prac-
tice of law, in particular to legal interpretation, see H. GADAmER, TRUTH AND METHOD (G. Barden &
J. Cumming trans. 1975); Bodenheimer, A Neglected Theory of Legal Reasoning, 21 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 373 (1969); Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHL L. REv. 835 (1987); and Lehman, Rules
in Law, 72 GEo. L.J. 1571 (1984).
41. See discussion infra Part VI.
42. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 49-53.
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objective grading practices and that are desirable because of our needs
to generate, justify, and explain a grading curve with many gradations.
Today, the Aristotelian model of reading Blue Books is an endan-
gered species, the apparent victim of a combination of circumstances.
These circumstances include the pervasive influence of the "scientific
method," as it has been understood and applied by law professors in
their testing philosophies and techniques; the vigorous competition for
high grades in this paradoxical era of a "lawyer surplus" and lucrative
employment opportunities for those who earn the best grades; and the
rightful demands of students for at least some explanation of their law
school grades. For understandable reasons these forces have caused us
to abandon essay examinations in some instances and, when essay ques-
tions are employed, to replace the Aristotelian method with "quantita-
tive" or "objective" methods of reading and grading essays. These latter
methods necessarily reward a student's ability to give many specific
right answers to examination questions. In other words, they reward a
student's abilities to perform the basic functions of issue spotting, rule
specification, and rule application quickly and productively. These
quantitative methods, however, give little if any consideration to the
broader, more practical, and professionally oriented skills that can be
recognized by the Aristotelian method. Though little direct evidence of
the relative use of these different grading methods exists, a pervasive
shift from the Aristotelian to the objective model can be inferred from
the indirect evidence of contemporary practices.
This shift in grading methods has been caused by both external
and internal influences on the modern law school. External influences
include "the science of testing," which emphasizes objective examina-
tion methods and criticizes the use of essay questions because they en-
tail unduly subjective, unreliable, and invalid evaluation methods.43
Another outside influence has been the experience of both law profes-
sors and law students with the pervasive objective and standardized
testing practices at all levels of American education." One internal
cause of this shift is the increasing emphasis on teaching rules in law
school classes. 45 This practice encourages examination makers to focus
43. See, e.g., Doubles, supra note 36; Nicldes, supra note 4, at 443-51.
44. See A. BASTIAN, N. FRUCHTER, M. Gr'rELL, C. GREER & K HASKINS, CHOOSING EQUALITY-
THE CASE FOR DEMOCRATIC SCHOOLING 72-75 (1986) (challenging "the extraordinary legitimacy now
vested in standardized testing and competitive test scores"). See generally D. OWEN, NONE OF THE
ABOvE: BEHIND THE MYTH OF SCHOLASTIC APTITUDE (1985) (indicting standardized tests used in
American education).
45. The modern emphasis on "explaining" or "covering" rules in the law school classroom
has been described and analyzed by many observers. See, e.g., T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAW-
YERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 162-68 (1977); Cramton, supra note 4, at 328; Gellhorn, The
Second and Third Years of Law Study, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 3 (1964); Kissam, supra note 3, at
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their Blue Books on issue identification, rule specification, and rule ap-
plication, for otherwise their exams would bear little relationship to
classroom work. This narrow focus lends itself to objective grading. The
increasing use of short-answer questions on contemporary law school
exams4 is undoubtedly another cause of quantitative grading of Blue
Book essays because these so-called objective questions have created an
attractive model that allows professors to explain grades on essay an-
swers as well. A third internal cause is the contemporary law students'
demand for "grading due process," or at least some explanation of their
law school grades.4" This demand, of course, is satisfied most easily by a
method of grading that demonstrates objectively the "points" a student
got and did not get in an examination answer; thus, a model answer or
scoring key that indicates different grade points allocated to the partic-
ular elements of a right answer is an efficient means of grading and
explaining essay answers as well as short answers.
Perhaps the most important cause of the shift from Aristotelian to
objective methods of evaluating Blue Book essays is the dual trend in
contemporary law schools towards employing grading scales with many
gradations and imposing mandatory grading curves on individual law
school courses. Many law schools in recent decades have modified the
traditional A-B-C-D-F grading scale by adding plus and minus letter
grades or by replacing the traditional scale with numerical scales that
provide for a veritable host of final grades.4 These "more refined"
265-66, 290-93; Vukowich, Comment: The Lack of Practical Training in Law Schools: Criticisms,
Causes, and Programs for Change, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 140 (1971).
46. See supra text accompanying note 31.
47. On changes in grading due process at American law schools during the past two decades,
see Doniger, Grades: Review of Academic Evaluations in Law School, 11 PAC. L.J. 743 (1980)
(describing a general increase from the 1950s to the 1970s in the rights of law students to inspect
their exams, the encouragement of students to review their exams, and the availability of appeal
procedures for contesting examination grades). Compare Spies, Examination Review, Dismissal,
and Readmission: Some Specific Practices, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 473, 476-77 (1957) (noting that in the
1950s, among 28 law schools surveyed, students were able to see their exams as a matter of right at
only 4 schools) with Nickles, supra note 4, at 437-38 & n.91 (noting that in 1975-76, among 98 law
schools responding, 60% reported that students are "encouraged to discuss individually the results
of their examinations with their teachers").
48. See Nickles, supra note 4, at 471 & nn.199 & 201 (reporting that as of 1975-76 more than
one-half of 102 responding law schools had expanded the number of officially recognized grades
beyond the five in the traditional A, B, C, D, and F scale). As of 1987-88, a review of available
catalogues in the University of Kansas School of Law's admissions office revealed that 32 of 38
national and regional law schools had expanded the number of their recognized grades beyond the
five grades of the traditional scale. See also Belot, Law School Grades and Curriculum Revised,
KU LAWS, Summer 1967, at 1 (explaining the University of Kansas School of Law's addition of two
grades, B+ and D+, to its grading scale in 1967 as a means of refining the faculty's measurement
of students' skills); Epstein, Grade Normalization, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 707 (1971) (explaining the
Southern California Law School's change in 1971 from a traditional grading scale to a more dis-
criminating one of 100 points as a means of refining the measurement of legal skills and of alleviat-
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grading scales have been accompanied by strong expectations among
many law school faculties-in some cases resulting in rules-that
grades in individual courses must reflect many levels of performance."9
These practices require that the final grades for satisfactory perform-
ance in each course be divided into many different categories. This im-
position of multiple grade distinctions surely discourages the qualitative
evaluation of Blue Book essays under the Aristotelian model.
Quantitative grading of each examination question, including es-
says, generates the many different grades that must be awarded in an
efficient manner. Quantitative grading also constitutes an efficient
means of explaining or justifying these grades to inquiring students.
What better basis could there be to explain authoritatively and quickly
to an angry, defensive, or hostile student the differences between grades
of, say, 88, 86, 83, 78, and 72, than a brief comparison between the
points of a "model answer" and the fewer points received for the stu-
dent's answer? Thus, our complex grading scales and our express or im-
plicit mandatory grading curves appear to be both a cause and an effect
of a modern shift to objective methods of reading, interpreting, and
evaluating Blue Book essays.
The contemporary discourse among law faculty about law students
and Blue Book exams provides additional evidence of the shift to an
objective method of grading Blue Book essays. Law faculty today do
not talk much about "A exams," "B exams," and "C exams," or "A
students," "B students," and "C students," as they apparently once
did. 0 Instead, our discourse is about the theological niceties of point
scales for grading essay answers; about "score sheets," "answer keys,"
and "model answers"; about "high and low C grades" or "near As and
near Bs" (distinctions within distinctions); and about "excellent," "av-
erage," and "weak" students, whom we tend to characterize exclusively
by examination scores and class ranks rather than by statements about
ing pressure on individual faculty members to explain grades to disappointed students).
49. As of 1975-76 only 9% of American law schools had established an explicit mandatory
grading curve for at least some of their courses. See Nickles, supra note 4, at 426 n.35. This study,
however, did not inquire about the extent of implicit norms that prescribe a particular distribution
of grades for individual courses in order to achieve grading fairness between different sections and
between different professors. The existence of these implicit norms in today's competitive law
school world, in which both faculty and students display substantial concern about grading fair-
ness, is'probably widespread. See generally Grant, Justice in Grading, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 186 (1956)
(arguing that each law school should establish a schoolwide standard for the grade distributions in
individual courses). For a description and evaluation of mandatory grading curves that have been
established by implicit norms in American colleges and schools, see J. HOLT, WHAT Do I Do MoN-
DAY? 255-58 (1970).
50. For an example of earlier talk, see Grant, supra note 38, at 926 (discussing "A scholars"
and "B scholars").
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their professional promise.5' The modern examination discourse among
law faculty, in other words, connotes credentials, quantitative measures,
the many specific elements that are necessary for good Blue Book an-
swers, and a student's relative standing among her peers. This discourse
is in stark contrast to the more absolute and standard-bound judgments
that were implied by the examination discourse among law faculty in
the past.
Of course, the Aristotelian and objective models of grading can be
combined in an individual professor's grading style. This hybrid model
includes practices such as: (1) the award of extra credit for a student's
good or superior classroom performance; (2) the award of additional
points on exam answers for well-organized or thoughtful essays; (3) the
award of a large number of exam points for identifying major issues or
making particularly insightful arguments; and (4) grading some but not
all essay answers by the Aristotelian method.2 With this hybrid model,
however, the essence of the evaluation process still is likely to be the
objective method for all the reasons that have caused the rise of the
objective method in the first place.
The immediate effect of grading essay answers under the objective
model is to make performance on these questions similar to perform-
ance on short-answer and objective questions. Under the objective
model, examination questions are likely to test essentially for issue
identification, rule specification, and rule application in order to make
the model work. Law professors, however, disagree vigorously in their
opinions about the values of different kinds of examination questions.
Some law professors, who believe in the science of testing, believe that
the only significant difference is that essay questions are less reliable
measures of the basic examination functions. In other words, they be-
lieve that essay questions are less capable than short-answer questions
of providing a consistent measurement of these functions over many
student answers. 3 In this view, the failure of law professors to use more
short-answer questions can be explained only by the forces of inertia
and lack of time for, skill at, or interest in learning to construct effec-
51. Cf. Feinman & Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73 GEo. L.J. 875, 879-81 (1985) (describ-
ing the dismal perspective on most students' potential abilities as lawyers that results from a pro-
fessor's reading of examination papers); Motley, supra note 4, at 723-24 (making a similar point as
described in the Feinmnan and Feldman article).
52. See Doubles, supra note 36, at 256-58 (advocating different grade points for the recogni-
tion of issues of different difficulty or importance); Trelease, Criteria of Grading, 23 RocKY MTN.
L. REv. 118, 121 (1950) (recommending that grade points be awarded for class participation). I owe
the general point in the text to my colleague Bob Jerry.
53. See, e.g., Motley, supra note 4, at 726-29; Nickles, supra note 4, at 443-51; Weihofen,
Types of Questions, 23 RocKY MTN. L. REv. 110, 112 (1950).
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tive short-answer questions."
Other professors continue to believe that short-answer questions
cannot replicate the often confusing and complex conditions of profes-
sional situations, and that the essay exam is necessary to test for com-
plex kinds of issue spotting and imaginative rule applications.5 5 A third
group might maintain that the essay exam is valuable because it offers
law students some opportunity to write about the law. In this view,
writing Blue Book essays is valuable simply because law students other-
wise would have little opportunity to write or to learn by writing while
they are in law school.56
These latter views about the value of Blue Book essay answers
would be more plausible if the proponents of these views could make
some showing that an Aristotelian method of grading is employed in
order to measure complex or imaginative rule applications, or a stu-
dent's writing ability, rather than a student's professional promise; un-
less the Aristotelian method is used, students will not have particular
incentives to focus on complexity or to write polished answers to Blue
Book essay questions. For the reasons indicated, I do not believe that
this showing of an Aristotelian method can be made. It follows that
objectively graded Blue Book essays are merely less reliable and less
valid tests of basic legal skills than well-constructed short-answer ques-
tions. That is, the two kinds of questions test the same skills, and essay
questions are more difficult to read and grade in a consistent manner.
In any event, the quantitative grading of Blue Book essays converts
essay questions into "objective" questions. This consequence creates
disadvantages. First, if all or most law school examinations focus merely
upon measuring the quantity of issues, rules, and rule applications that
a student can perform under substantial time constraints, it is likely
that the paradigm of good paragraph thinking will be imprinted effec-
tively in the consciousness of most students as the way to deal with
legal problems.
Second, if we are testing only or mainly for issue spotting, rule
specification, and rule applications in borderline cases, what does this
suggest about the learning that occurs in legal education during the rest
of the academic semester? Will not teachers have an incentive to limit
their courses to establishing the many objective bases, the rules and
holdings of precedents, for scoring the final examination?5 7 Will not
students have an incentive to spend their semesters concentrating on
54. See Nickles, supra note 4, at 448-50.
55. See, e.g., Doubles, supra note 36, at 255.
56. I owe this point to my colleague Bill Westerbeke.
57. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 277-78.
1989]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the preparation of extensive examination outlines rather than on care-
ful daily reading or other class preparations that the myth of the case
method and Socratic dialogue would lead one to expect? 5 Further,
might not student outlining tend to focus excessively on the specifica-
tion and memorization of rules and holdings, which constitute the cer-
tain bases for one's performance under the objective grading model? 59
Under this scenario much student outlining may ignore the richer
learning and insights that can result from outlining, review, and prac-
tice that are focused on developing new connections between the differ-
ent elements of complex subjects. These connections, of course, are
necessary to help the law student construct imaginative interpretations
of complex authority and innovative, persuasive arguments that would
help clients in unique situations. The different adverse effects of the
objective grading model should be of substantial concern to anyone who
is interested in the quality of American legal education. Before consid-
ering these consequences in full perspective, however, we must examine
some additional aspects of the examination experience.
E. The Deep Structure of Blue Books
The foregoing discussion described the surface aspects of Blue
Book exams. This subpart considers the deeper structure of law school
examinations, a structure which consists of several related patterns that
represent the major purposes, functions, and consequences of these ex-
ams. This inquiry is necessary to develop an effective understanding of
the functions and disfunctions of the current examination system.
The structure of Blue Book exams can be described by six princi-
ples. These principles are the emphasis on speed in Blue Book exams,
the surprise element in most Blue Book questions, the comprehensive
qualities of the Blue Book exam process, the demand for a kind of
thinking that typically is associated with oral rather than written com-
munication, the enhancement of professorial authority and domination,
and the inherent masculine code of Blue Book thought and language.
Besides many direct interrelationships, these principles appear to have
a common grounding in a conservative law school politics or, as Duncan
Kennedy would put it, in the center-right politics of private law doc-
58. See A. VANDERBILT, supra note 25, at 85-91; Younger, supra note 15, at 146-47. Both
authors recommend that law students develop outlines throughout the semester in order to pre-
pare themselves for Blue Book examinations.
59. Cf. Motley, supra note 4, at 729, 737 (stating that law students spend excessive time
memorizing in preparation for exams); Comment, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School,
1968 Wis. L. REV. 1201, 1208-09 (noting that the memorization of rules as preparation for law
school exams provides a degree of needed personal or psychological certainty).
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trine.60 A conservative politics, then, provides the foundation for the
deep structure of the contemporary Blue Book system.
1. Speed
Blue Book exams clearly emphasize speed in performance. With
some law professors this emphasis stems from the time constraints they
impose on Blue Book exams for no particular reason, other than tradi-
tion. This emphasis also may stem from a conscious belief among many
law professors that speed or quickness is important to many legal situa-
tions and therefore should be measured by Blue Book exams.
In major part, however, this emphasis on speed stems from a more
obscure source, which suggests that the Blue Book demand for speed
often is excessive as a matter of good educational and testing practices.
This source is the perceived need of many schools and professors to
impose grading curves with many distinctions on examination perform-
ances in individual courses.6 1 Multiple grade categories can be gener-
ated and explained to students most easily by establishing the final
exam as a race and then observing the order in which contestants cross
the finish line. The race is created by establishing relatively complex
problems for the time alowed-"overfacting" as some students
say-and by using objective grading methods for essay questions. In-
deed, this sort of examination is almost mandated by the expectations
of law faculties that each individual course should result in many differ-
ent grades. Yet, treating Blue Book exams as a race, while possibly a
good test of speed, is unsound as educational practice and may even fail
to measure accurately the qualities that it purports to measure. The
principle of speed rewards students for answers that merely identify a
maximum number of issues and specify precisely many different rules.
This principle tends to de-emphasize, discourage, and penalize student
writing that involves coherence, depth, contextual richness, and
imagination. 2
2. Surprise
Blue Book exams also are based on surprise. This principle requires
that exam questions be essentially different from any problems that the
students may have studied during the semester. To be sure, many ex-
60. See Kennedy, The Political Significance of the Structure of the Law School Curriculum,
14 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1983). In other words, quickness, surprise, comprehensiveness in lieu of
depth, a reliance on oral communications to deflect serious questions, and an aggressive division
and separation of ideas and issues into many parts are methods of conserving power, of listening
without hearing, that persons with interests in any status quo are certain to favor.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
62. See Motley, supra note 4, at 736-37; Nickles, supra note 4, at 452-53.
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amination issues in particular courses are repeated from year to year
and other issues may be hinted at in class discussions. Surprise, how-
ever, still can be achieved on an exam by disguising the legal issues in a
welter of complex facts and detail. The explicit rationale for this princi-
ple is the purported need to test students on gross issue spotting (the
first exam function). In addition, many professors appear to believe
that all good lawyers must have the poise and quick wit to deal with
continuous surprises because good appellate advocates are believed to
possess these qualities. Professors believe in the benefits of these quali-
ties, of course, because they showed such poise and quick wit on their
own Blue Book exams." Nevertheless, the more obscure basis of the
surprise principle, the perceived need to spread students out along a
grading curve with many gradations, suggests that this principle is also
used to excess on Blue Book exams. For example, although the surprise
principle is perhaps necessary to test for gross issue identification, the
combined factors of surprise and speed severely diminish the possibili-
ties of testing for the more discrete and complex kinds of issue identifi-
cation that are involved in rule application. In this latter process, the
analyst often must develop detailed analogies and make careful distinc-
tions between particular cases in the course of applying general rules.
Both the surprise and speed principles of Blue Book exams surely de-
feat the possibility of testing for this important aspect of legal
imagination.
3. Comprehensiveness
Blue Book exams tend to be comprehensive in two ways. First,
most examinations purport to test students comprehensively on the
subject matter of the course, to provide a "fair chance" for students to
deal with questions in areas of their relative interests or strengths, and
to enforce comprehensive study and review by students. 4 In view of the
time constraints on Blue Book exams, this thrust towards comprehen-
siveness suggests that most exams will reward the comprehensive con-
sideration of issues more than the depth or complexity of a student's
analysis.
Second, Blue Book exams in the aggregate constitute the focus of
most learning and writing by students while they are in law school, with
the notable but limited exceptions of law review, clinics, and research
seminars or workshops. This comprehensiveness seems to leave many
law students with the mistaken impression that Blue Book work is the
paradigm of good legal analysis. Thus, the students may leave with a
63. See Kissam, supra note 8, at 163; Motley, supra note 4, at 731-32.
64. See Nickles, supra note 4, at 432 n.65.
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correspondingly poor education in the areas of serious writing, complex
and theoretical legal analysis, client planning, or any other skill that
could be emphasized by law school courses featuring different kinds of
writing and evaluation.6 5 One might conclude that the comprehensive-
ness of Blue Book exams in these two ways tends to produce superficial
analyses by all participants, including those who do quite well and
those who do less well in their examination grades.
4. Oral Communication
The style and substance of the thought and writing required by
Blue Book exams-good paragraph thinking and writing-appear to be
closer in nature to the thought process that is typically used in oral
communication rather than serious writing. Blue Book writing about is-
sues, rules, and rule application must be done quickly, with little time
for the critical organization of materials and ideas, the reflection, and
the feedback from one's own written words that constitute the heart of
most effective thinking and writing about complex matters.66 In other
words, Blue Book thinking and writing must be performed in a rela-
tively precise but simple style, a style that is surely a hallmark of oral
communication rather than serious writing. Thus, Blue Book thinking
and communication approximates a strange, one-sided conversation or,
at best, a superficial kind of "instrumental writing" that translates a
student's instant thoughts about complex matters into written form im-
mediately.67 Blue Book communication does not approximate the good
"critical writing" that can help writers develop the analytical abilities
demanded by legal interpretation, evaluation, and planning.6 8 Thus, it
is a mistake to suggest that Blue Book essays offer any valid test of
writing ability or any valuable practice in legal writing, unless we un-
derstand these claims to be merely arguments for the values and style
of good paragraph thinking and writing.
5. Power/Dependency
The Blue Book system artificially enhances power/dependency re-
lations between law faculty and their students. Of course, all examina-
tions must be set and evaluated by persons in a position of authority,
but law school exams enhance the authority of law professors and the
65. For an argument in favor of clinical as opposed to traditional legal education, see Am-
sterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 612 (1984).
66. For a good description of the process of serious writing, which includes the benefits of
reflection, feedback from initial writing, and critical organization of ideas through outlining and
sequential drafts, see P. ELBOW, WRITING WITH POWER (1981).
67. See Kissam, supra note 8, at 138-41, 143 n.21.
68. See id.
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deference paid them in significant and unnecessary ways. First, the stu-
dents receive alphabetical or numerical symbols as the basic if not ex-
clusive evaluation of their work, and these symbols rarely if ever are
accompanied by institutionally specified standards of performance.6 9
Students are thus left with an inexact and mysterious communication
from their professors about the quality of their work, and these symbols
can be given a definite meaning only by comparing one's grades to the
grades of other students or by considering employment opportunities
that might be opened or foreclosed by such grades. Given this situation
it is not surprising that many students overvalue and misinterpret the
significance of law school examinations and grades.70 It also is not sur-
prising that law students learn to defer to professors as experts with
unchallengeable authority who possess the priestly power of dispensing
these mysterious symbols.7'
Second, the use of one examination in each course, the lack of
much instruction and practice for, or feedback on, a student's perform-
ance of the basic examination functions," and the marked discontinuity
between course work and exam work noted previously," produce addi-
tional mysteries about what is expected on these examinations and
about what factors determine the grades.74 These substantive mysteries,
which seem to be dissipated only marginally by a student's experience
with law school courses and examinations, surely encourage the ex-
traordinary deference given by law students to law professors, who seem
to be perceived as ideal judges or idealized professional experts.7 This
deference, of course, serves to enhance the professors' rather natural
feelings of authority, dominance, and expertise that go with the role of
university teacher in the first place.
6. Masculine Discourse
Finally, the discourse of Blue Book exams is predominantly a mas-
culine discourse-one that employs values, techniques, and concepts
that are more widely shared among men than women. Following Profes-
sor Carol Gilligan, we might say that our contemporary Blue Book lan-
69. Nickles, supra note 4, at 425.
70. See Motley, supra note 4, at 731; see also discussion infra Part IV A.
71. On the excessive deference that law students pay to law professors, see Pickard, Experi-
ence as Teacher: Discovering the Politics of Law Teaching, 33 U. TORONTO L.J. 279 (1983); Shaffer
& Redmount, Legal Education: The Classroom Experience, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 190 (1976); and
Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HAv. L. REv. 392, 411-12 (1971).
72. See generally Motley, supra note 4.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
74. See Mohr & Rodgers, Legal Education: Some Student Reflections, 25 J. LEGAL Enuc.
403, 416 (1973); Comment, supra note 59, at 1208.
75. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 258-59; Pickard, supra note 71, at 284-89.
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guage is a male code that employs rules, boundaries, game playing,
speed, and numbers in order to characterize and divide many matters,
interests, and persons into separate and disconnected elements. This
discourse ignores the more distinctively feminine patterns of thought,
moral discourse, and judgment that feature an ethic of caring or a mo-
rality of the web-in other words, thinking and caring about complex
relations and interdependencies among persons, ideas, and situations. 6
Alternatively, as a French feminist might say, our examination language
seems phallocentric in its construction of lines of rules and loosely re-
lated issues that attempt binary divisions between reason and chaos,
objective fact and subjective value, or orderly rules and unruly contexts.
In this view, the language of Blue Books disadvantages women by ig-
noring the inherent wholeness, diffuseness, contextuality, and complex-
ity of an ideal female or prephallocentric language.77
Women are certainly capable of mastering the masculine code of
law school examinations. Many women obtain the highest law school
grades, although some evidence suggests that women students may not
obtain as many high grades as male students who enter law school with
the same credentials.7 8 In any event, this principle of a masculine code
suggests that our current examination system is insufficiently pluralistic
as a means of student evaluation and as the basic experience through
which most law students perceive legal practice and thought. Some re-
sistance to the status quo and change towards a more pluralistic process
seem appropriate.
F. The Attributes of Blue Book Success
The examination functions, our quantitative grading methods, our
complex grading scales and curves, and the deep structure of Blue Book
exams suggest that certain attributes are necessary to obtain successful
law school grades. Examination of these attributes is necessary for three
reasons. First, although issue spotting, the specification of rules, and
76. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOP-
MENT (1982); see also Worden, Overshooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of Legal Edu-
cation, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1141 (1985) (applying Professor Gilligan's ideas to legal education in
general).
77. See Jones, Writing the Body: Toward an Understanding of l'Ecriture Feminine, in THE
NEW FEMINIST CRITICISM 261 (E. Showalter ed. 1985) [hereinafter E. SHOWALTER]; Littleton, Re-
constructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1279 (1987) (arguing that existing equality doc-
trine is phallocentric).
78. See Zenoff & Lorio, What We Know, What We Think We Know, and What We Don't
Know About Women Law Professors, 25 Amiz. L. REv. 869, 891-92 (1983); see also Teitelbaum,
Feminist Theory and Standardized Testing, in GENDER/BODY/KNWLEDGE: FEMINIST RECONSTRUC-
TIONS OF BEING AND KNOWING (A. Jagger & S. Bordo eds.) (forthcoming 1989) (arguing that stan-
dardized college board tests may disadvantage women).
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rule application under severe time constraints may constitute a rela-
tively insignificant aspect of most legal practices, these functions may
reflect and measure more general talents or skills that are of direct im-
portance to the practice of law. Conversely, these general attributes or
talents may throw light on the limits and adverse consequences of the
current examination system. Finally, from a humanistic perspective,
this inquiry will help us to understand what Blue Book exams do to
persons-both students and faculty-and how the Blue Book experi-
ence should be interpreted by individuals.
Successful performance on Blue Book exams appears to require
some imprecise combination of four complex but general attributes. I
call these attributes the internalization of doctrine; conventional legal
imagination; the quality of legal productivity; and the capacity for self-
study and self-learning in diffuse, complex, and uncertain situations.
The internalization of doctrine requires at least some memorization
of rules. More significantly, it requires understanding legal doctrine in
two different ways. First, the student must understand, tacitly or other-
wise, how the rules in a particular subject are applied conventionally to
given types of situations. For example, in constitutional law, one must
understand that the "rational basis" test frequently is applied by spec-
ulating about possible government purposes for a challenged regulation,
and one must understand the various sorts of speculative purposes that
plausibly can be advanced to defend different kinds of economic regula-
tion.'19 Second, the internalization of doctrine requires understanding
how the rules in a particular subject relate to each other. One must
recognize which rules may overlap or conflict in common situations,
which rules are always separate, and which rules are important subrules
of others.8 0 These aspects of doctrinal internalization-memorization, a
tacit understanding of rule application, and understanding the organi-
zation or framework of the rules-seem to be necessary, though not suf-
ficient, conditions to engage in successful issue spotting, rule specif-
ication, and rule application on time-limited Blue Book exams. In addi-
tion, to accomplish doctrinal internalization successfully, some aptitude
79. See, e.g., Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Dem-
ocratic Theory, 67 CALIn. L. RE V. 1049 (1979); Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65
MINN. L. REv. 1 (1980); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. RE V. 1
(1972).
80. For example, the successful exam writer in a constitutional law course must understand
how to disentangle and order the often related due process and equal protection issues under the
fourteenth amendment; the relationship between the "state action" subissue and these more gen-
eral issues; and the clear differences between the commerce power doctrine, which affects Con-
gress's power to regulate interstate commerce, and the "dormant" or "negative" commerce clause
doctrine, which limits the power of state governments to regulate interstate commerce.
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for repetitive work with complex intellectual details probably is a very
helpful if not necessary condition."'
A second attribute that leads to success on Blue Book exams is the
skill of conventional legal imagination. Without this skill, a student
writing Blue Book exams will not see as many issues as other students
and will fail to develop as many relevant connections between authori-
ties and the facts in applying rules to complex situations.8 2 This quality
of conventional legal imagination can be developed by the internaliza-
tion of doctrine, repeated practice at identifying issues in similar situa-
tions, and the acquisition of a tacit sense of the analogies that the
profession considers acceptable in a given field."' The exercise of this
imagination, however, also seems to require a substantial degree of nat-
ural talent or "vision." We might say, then, that this attribute rests
fundamentally on some sort of special legal vision, which can be devel-
oped in part (but only in part) by a careful, sometimes frustrating,
sometimes mysterious, and ideally reflective process of practice, feed-
back, and experience.8 4
A third attribute is "legal productivity" or, in other words, the abil-
ity to spot issues, specify rules, and apply rules effectively under sub-
stantial time pressure. Specifically, this skill involves recalling specific
rules, organizing one's thoughts about possible connections between
rules and facts, and writing precisely and quickly in a way that con-
vinces the reader of the exam writer's ability to perform conventional
legal analysis of new situations. This productivity clearly requires prior
internalization of doctrine and the exercise of legal imagination com-
bined with considerable speed in the writer's execution of conventional
analysis. The paradigm of good paragraph thinking/writing (issue, rule,
and rule application, with quick and frequent repeats) provides an apt
description of this intellectual process. Thus, this paradigm is a suffi-
cient if not necessary style for writing effective Blue Book essays and
answering other Blue Book questions.
The exercise of examination productivity, especially in view of the
speed required, appears to involve a significant degree of natural talent,
81. See Woodard, Progress and Poverty in American Law and Legal Education, 37 SYRA-
cusE L. REv. 795, 814-19 (1986) (stating that law schools contributed to the rise of the corporate
bar in the late nineteenth century by providing law review editors who, by reason of their high
grades, had demonstrated a capacity to perform the routine but complex work that corporate law
firms were beginning to demand of young attorneys).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
83. See Boyle, The Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 1003, 1053-54 (1985) (advis-
ing new law students on the need to focus on the analogies that the legal profession currently deem
acceptable in particular fields).
84. Cf. Motley, supra note 4, at 747-60 (describing a regime of practice, feedback, and repeti-
tion as a means of employing the law school examination as an instrument of education).
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like the exercise of legal imagination. This is not to say that simulated
practice at issue spotting, rule specification, and rule application under
time pressure-particularly when the issues, rules, and facts are similar
to those on the final exam-might not help everyone improve their ex-
amination performances. On the contrary, the limited evidence availa-
ble suggests that supervised practice can have this effect.8 5 It remains
true, however, that some law students simply are faster than others at
performing conventional examination analysis. Thus the time con-
straints of Blue Book exams are likely to generate the grade distribu-
tions for our mandatory grading curves with little difficulty, especially if
practice with the same or similar issues and individualized feedback are
not provided to law students in some organized and effective way.
The fourth attribute of Blue Book success is admittedly a residual
category. This attribute is the capacity for self-study and self-learning
in complex, diffuse, and uncertain situations. This concept recognizes
the importance of a student's ability to acquire and exercise the skills
of doctrinal internalization, legal imagination, and legal productivity
largely on her own, without much effective instruction, organized prac-
tice, or supervised feedback from the professor. This capacity includes
an ability to work effectively over relatively sustained periods of time,
whether the period includes the entire semester or a more condensed
examination review period. The nature and importance of this attribute
will become clearer in Part III, when the relationships between law
school course work and examinations are considered. We are in a posi-
tion at this point to note two important dimensions of this attribute.
One dimension is the ability to understand, respect, and pay defer-
ence to the diffuse authority of appellate cases, casebooks, treatises, and
the professor's classroom discussion about legal doctrine. The student
must draw from this authority some sense of the appropriate ways to
internalize doctrine, to articulate issues, rules, and rule applications,
and to write Blue Book answers that communicate an understanding of
complex legal materials- to examination readers.
A second dimension of this capacity for self-study and self-learning
concerns the student's ability to acquire various kinds of tacit profes-
sional knowledge. The first three attributes of Blue Book success each
rest in substantial part on certain kinds of tacit knowledge or, in other
words, on the knowledge of things "we know but cannot say." ' Tacit
knowledge appears to be a major factor in all kinds of professional
85. See Feinman & Feldman, supra note 4; Roberts, Methods for Review and Quiz in "Case
System" Law Schools, 1 AM. L. SCH. REV. 222, 224 (1904).
86. See M. POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION (1966); D. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE
PRACTITIONER. TOWARD A NEW DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROFESSIONS 22-26
(1987); Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1773-78 (1987).
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work,17 and it should not be surprising that performance on law school
examinations requires a substantial amount of this stuff. Yet little ex-
planation is available about the nature of this knowledge or how indi-
viduals acquire it. What can be said, however, is that the ability to
obtain tacit knowledge appears to rest on some combination of inherent
talent and a person's repeated practice with, reflection on, and experi-
ence with similar or recurrent situations.88 Recognition of this hidden
element in successful Blue Book writing may help us understand the
enigma of why some students succeed and others fail at obtaining good
or "the very best" law school grades.8"
III. BLUE BOOKS IN CONTEXT
This Part examines the social context of law school exams. Several
relationships between Blue Book exams, other law school practices, and
professional practices that influence or are influenced by law school
work are considered. Some of these relationships reinforce our examina-
tion practices and help to explain the current system. Others will help
indicate some of the values, limits, and adverse effects of our Blue Book
system.
I analyze this context in five subparts. The first two subparts ex-
amine entrance to the law school community and the direct practical
consequences of examinations and grades. These practices establish the
preconditions (or predispositions of the participants) of our examina-
tion system. The last three subparts consider some more subtle rela-
tionships between Blue Books, law school course work, and legal
practices.
This inquiry reveals that Blue Book exams have a mixture of mani-
fest and latent functions.9 0 The manifest functions include the prepara-
tion of students to pass state bar exams, the screening of students for
employers (especially larger corporate law firms), and the teaching and
evaluating of students in the performance of some basic skills, though
these latter functions are accomplished in only limited ways. This mul-
tiplicity of purposes for a single instrument, the examination, suggests
that none of these purposes, especially the teaching function, is likely to
87. See generally D. SCHON, supra note 86; D. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIoNER: How
PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983).
88. See D. SCHON, supra note 86, at 22-79; D. SCHON, supra note 87.
89. While some faculty and some students undoubtedly believe that they can say why some
students do well on Blue Book exams and others do not, upon careful examination these state-
ments are either too general to be useful or merely explanations of right and wrong answers on
examinations already taken. These faculty and students are thus unable to say how one can per-
form to obtain A grades on Blue Book exams.
90. On the distinction between manifest and latent purposes or social functions, see R.
MERTON, SOcIAL THEORY AND SocIAL STRUCTURE 114-18 (1968).
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be achieved in its full measure.91
In addition, our examination system serves some latent and darker
functions, which include the reaffirmation of both conservative legal
ideology and professorial prowess. Placing Blue Book exams in context,
then, like our analysis of the examination itself, indicates that the mod-
ern examination system has several adverse educational effects and is
insufficiently pluralistic-at least if we actually seek to achieve pluralis-
tic educational objectives.
A. Admitting Students, Hiring Faculty
Law schools constitute themselves by their decisions to hire new
faculty members and to admit particular kinds of students. Today,
these practices clearly reinforce the quantitative grading, objectivism,
and competition that pervade the modern law school's examination sys-
tem. Law schools, in other words, become committed to these practices
by inviting into the community persons who are most likely to be adept
at and comfortable with competitive and quantitative measurements.
Other factors influence the hiring of new faculty, but acquiring
high grades on law school examinations seems to be a necessary condi-
tion for appointment at most schools.92 Thus, most law professors are
likely to have a significant attachment to the modern examination sys-
tem based on instinct and emotion as well as rationality. Their success
with the Blue Book system will be associated with, and perhaps is a
cause of, their subsequent professional and economic successes. Because
the Blue Book examination proved beneficial for many law faculty, it is
unlikely that they would entertain substantial criticisms of the system.
Indeed, we might say that a subtle reason (if not an intended one) for
hiring most law professors is their implicit interest in maintaining the
status quo on law school examinations.
Students are admitted to law schools today primarily on the basis
of their prior successes with competitive and objective examination sys-
tems. The Law School Aptitude Test (LSAT) is a competitive and ob-
jectively scored exam, and LSAT scores are one of two major bases for
admissions decisions at competitive and prestigious law schools. 3 The
undergraduate grades of applicants are the other element;94 these
91. See generally J. TIMBERGEN, ON THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC POLICY (1952).
92. See Fossum, Law Professors: A Profile of the Teaching Branch of the Profession, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 501, 509; Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological
Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 91, 107 (1968); Zenoff & Barron, So You Want to
Hire a Law Professor?, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 492, 495 (1983).
93. See, e.g., Erlanger, Toward a Sociology of Law School Admissions, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc.
374, 381 (1984).
94. See id.
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grades also are likely to have been earned largely on the basis of com-
petitive and objectively scored examinations given the pervasive influ-
ence of standardized tests and "scientific testing methods" in American
schools, colleges, and universities.9 5 Thus, most contemporary law stu-
dents probably enter the law school community with an inherent appre-
ciation for competitive and quantitatively scored exams that
approximate those examinations which served as the basis for their ad-
mission in the first place. Although this appreciation may lessen during
one's stay in law school, we shall see that the expectation of students
for some kind of objective evaluation system appears to play an influen-
tial role throughout the course of law school work.9
B. The Practical Consequences of Exams and Grades
The direct functions of law school examinations are to prepare stu-
dents to pass state bar examinations and to generate a highly disaggre-
gated class ranking system. Law school grades and class ranks are used
to select students for the law school's prestigious extracurricular activi-
ties such as law review, moot court programs, and clinic directorships.
Most significantly, legal employers use class ranks and law review status
to screen and select law students for the more prestigious and lucrative
employment opportunities that the legal profession has to offer. These
practical consequences impose significant constraints on the nature of
law school examinations and constitute a possible justification for the
present system. As will be shown, however, these consequences proba-
bly could be obtained through modified examination practices that
would help to establish more effective and more democratic forms of
legal education. Thus, the practical consequences of exams and grades
help to explain the Blue Book system, but do not justify it.
Historically there has existed a close relationship between law
school examinations and written state licensure examinations. Origi-
nally, written state bar examinations were modeled on or influenced by
the written examinations that Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell in-
troduced to Harvard Law School in 1870. 9 State bar exams have con-
95. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
96. See discussion infra Part Im C (describing incomplete and mystifying relationships be-
tween classroom work and examinations, with many students concentrating on studying the objec-
tive bases of examination answers); see also discussion infra Part IV A (suggesting that law
students often misinterpret law school grades as a valid or objective measure of their abilities as
lawyers).
97. See J. HURsT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAw-THE LAW MAKERs 261-63 (1950); cf. R.
SravWNs, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s, at 94, 105 n.20
(1983) (noting that Professor Langdell may have introduced written examinations at Harvard be-
cause Harvard students had done poorly on written licensure exams introduced by some Massa-
chusetts counties in 1870).
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tinued to reflect, as well as influence, the form and substance of law
school exams throughout the twentieth century.98 In the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, law schools supported the establishment
of written licensure examinations because these exams made law
schools more attractive as providers of training for prospective
lawyers. 9
Today, law schools employ evidence of their students' abilities to
pass state licensure exams as a measure of the school's quality and as
an inducement for students to attend their school.100 The similarity be-
tween Blue Book exams and state licensure exams thus is not surpris-
ing. This similarity surely means that a student's experience in taking
twenty-five to thirty Blue Book exams in the course of a law school
career will constitute effective, if not the most appropriate, preparation
for taking bar exams.10 1 This connection between examination systems,
however, does not demonstrate that Blue Book exams should be the
only or even the primary method of testing student performance in law
school. Perhaps experience with ten or so Blue Book exams on basic
subjects would constitute sufficient preparation for bar exams, espe-
cially if law schools were to improve their teaching of the basic analyti-
cal skills of doctrinal internalization, conventional legal imagination,
and legal productivity.
Law students historically have been screened for employment op-
portunities on the basis of highly disaggregated class ranking systems
based on the cumulative grade point averages of students in each law
school class. In the 1880s, New York City law firms began to realize
98. Compare Reed, Present-Day Law Schools in the United States and Canada, in 21 CAR-
NEGE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING REPORT 46-49 (1928) (reporting on law
school-bar examination relations in the 1920s) with Adams, New CUNY Dean to Face Pressure to
Move School into the Mainstream, Nat'l L.J., June 8, 1987, at 4, col. 3; and Margolick, At the Bar:
CUNY Law School, a Trail-blazer in Legal Education, Finds itself at a Crossroad, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 19, 1988, at B7, Col. 1 (reporting that the low pass rate of its graduates on the New York bar
exam may force reforms of the innovative curriculum, teaching, and examination practices at the
City University of New York Law School at Queens College). Note that the increase in the use of
short-answer questions on Blue Book exams, see supra note 31 and accompanying text, has accom-
panied an increasing reliance by state bar examiners on the short-answer Multistate Bar Exam,
which was introduced in 1973 and is used today by 46 states, the District of Columbia, and several
territories. See Tarpley, NCBE Introduces New Feature to Bar Exam, ABA SYLLAUs, March
1988, at 8.
99. See Reed, supra note 98, at 48.
100. Why, for example, do the deans and faculty of state and local law schools care so much
about the pass rate of their graduates who take the local bar examination? Cf. Margolick, supra
note 98 (reporting pressure from university administrators on the CUNY Law School to improve
the pass rate of CUNY's graduates on the New York bar exam).
101. Cf. Kleinberg & Barnes, CUNY Law School: Outside Perspectives and Reflections, 12
NOVA L.J. 1, 1-25 (1987) (describing CUNY's innovative curriculum, which de-emphasizes Blue
Book exams, and noting that a low pass rate of CUNY graduates on the state bar exam has created
pressures for a more traditional law school curriculum).
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that the highest grades on Blue Book exams at Harvard Law School
might be a good indicator of a law student's ability to excel at the com-
plex but routinized work that new corporate law firms were beginning
to demand of their younger lawyers."°2 Since then most law schools
have developed exam systems that generate highly disaggregated class
rankings, which serve the interests of both corporate law firms and stu-
dents who are interested in working for these firms.103 This screening
system, moreover, appears to be a relatively efficient and effective de-
vice to the extent that these firms seek to hire persons with a general
promise of productivity and capacity for self-learning in diffuse and un-
certain situations. These attributes are measured by Blue Book exams
in a rough and general way.10 4
Less clear, however, is whether the preparation of students for
state bar exams or the screening of students for prospective employers
requires the objectivism and multiple grading distinctions of our cur-
rent Blue Book system. One presumably could construct an adequately
disaggregated class ranking system, provide for fair grading between
professors, and afford due process to individual students without em-
ploying grading scales that require so many diverse categories. After all,
Harvard Law School apparently is able to generate adequate class rank-
ings with a traditional grading scale of A-B-C-D-F.105 Similarly, one
could achieve a disaggregated class ranking, fairness between profes-
sors, and due process by using different kinds of law school examina-
tions and by using the Aristotelian rather than the objective grading
method, though law professors might have to work harder at evaluating
students and explaining their grades under the Aristotelian model.10 6
Thus, the practical consequences of law school exams and grades help
to explain our current examination system, but these consequences are
an inadequate justification for the system's more prominent features,
such as its emphasis on a limited kind of productivity and the exclusive
use of time-limited Blue Book exams. Our current practices may be jus-
tified on other grounds; but before considering these grounds, subparts
C, D, and E examine the more complex relationships between law
school exams, law school course work, and legal practices in general.
102. See Woodard, supra note 81, at 814-19.
103. See, e.g., A. KANTER, KANTER ON HIRING: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO LAWYER HIRING 33-37
(1983); D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY A POLEMIC AGAINST
THE SYSTEM 26-70 (1983).
104. See supra text accompanying notes 85-89.
105. See S. TURow, supra note 30, at 232-33 (describing an apparent implicit grading curve
for first-year students at Harvard Law School as one that produces about 20 percent As, 60 per-
cent Bs, and 20 percent Cs, "with a smattering of Ds and Fs").
106. See discussion infra Part VI.
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C. From Classroom to Exam
The relationships between the classroom work of law school
courses, the studies of students outside the classroom, and Blue Book
exams are complex and murky. To understand these relationships, we
must explore in some detail the nature of daily law school work, its
connections and disconnections with examinations, and the influence
that law school exams have on the work of students and faculty. This
inquiry shows how the Blue Book system accomplishes, distorts, and
contradicts its ostensible purposes of teaching and evaluating the acqui-
sition of legal skills and doctrine. At the same time, this inquiry will
show, though tacitly, the kind of self-study and self-learning that is re-
quired for students to perform well on Blue Book examinations.
Law school course work and its relationship to exams can be char-
acterized by two themes: fragmentation and discontinuity. Fragmenta-
tion results from the texts that law students are expected to read, from
the texts that they read on their own, and from classroom discourse.
This fragmentation enhances the substantial discontinuities that exist
between a student's course work and her work for final exams. The
fragmentation and discontinuity serve some complex functions and
have various consequences. On the one hand, this situation may ap-
proximate the nature of much professional work, for it certainly places
a premium on a student's capacity for a limited kind of self-study and
self-learning. On the other hand, the fragmentation and discontinuity
violate several principles of effective learning, including repetition,
practice at complex tasks, and obtaining effective feedback from more
experienced supervisors that is aimed at improving performance rather
than explaining grades. In other words, the fragmentation and disconti-
nuity in law school work deny to most students the opportunity to prac-
tice and then reflect with more experienced persons about professional
work involving tacit knowledge.107 Fragmentation and discontinuity also
promote the private interests of law faculty in scholarship and consult-
ing work by encouraging law professors to acquire and demonstrate a
mastery of doctrinal knowledge at the expense of affording their stu-
dents a more effective education in the practical skills and basic doc-
trines of lawyering.
Let us consider first the fragmented array of texts that students are
expected to read in most law school courses. The typical casebook
107. See Motley, supra note 4, at 747-60; see also D. SCHON, supra note 86 (analyzing the
nature of practical or clinical education of "reflective practitioners"); Teich, Research on American
Law Teaching: Is There a Case Against the Case System?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167 (1986) (noting
that only individualized teaching methods, in particular computer-aided instruction that provides
feedback on the work of individual students, have been demonstrated capable of improving the
performance of law students on law school exams).
[Vol. 42:433
LAW SCHOOL EXAMINATIONS
presents appellate court opinions as the staple reading assignment, but
it presents only excerpts of these opinions that typically deny students
access to the full range of historical facts, doctrinal and political rea-
sons, and prior texts that a court has relied on in making and justifying
a particular decision. Appellate court opinions respond directly to the
briefs of parties to the suit and typically rely heavily on prior authorita-
tive texts of statutes, legislative history, and precedents as justification
for a particular decision. Students who read only casebook excerpts
(and many students have time to do little else if they read carefully)
will have only indirect reports of the prior texts, which must be under-
stood in order to understand and interpret effectively any text that
forms part of a written tradition.108
The judicial opinions in casebooks also are interpreted and em-
ployed by the legal profession as part of yet another text, the text of
current law. This text is described in most casebooks, if at all, only in
the partial and subterranean forms of opinions that emphasize prior
doctrine and the "notes and questions" that typically accompany the
excerpts of appellate opinions. Unsurprisingly, the student's awareness
of this subtext of contemporary doctrine encourages prolific reading by
students in legal treatises, hornbooks, and commercially published case
outlines, which supplement or replace the assigned readings in
casebooks. 0 9
Another critical text for those who wish to do well on Blue Book
exams is the text of the professor's views on the subject in question.
This text frequently can be obtained only by taking voluminous notes
of everything the professor says, together with meticulous review and
replication of these notes at exam time."10 This text, however, is often
very fragmentary because it is delivered in the classroom, and it can
become even more fragmented and less coherent as understood and re-
108. On the need to understand the tradition of relevant prior texts, including interpreta-
tions of these texts, in interpreting a particular text, see H. GADAmER, supra note 40.
109. See S. TuRow, supra note 30, at 46-48, 80, 167, 180 (describing the use of law review
articles, treatises, and commercial outlines by first-year Harvard law students); A- VANDERm.T,
supra note 25, at 80-83 (noting the availability of commercial outlines and legal treatises as means
that may help students to understand their casebook readings); Feinman & Feldman, supra note 4,
at 542 (recognizing a "subculture of law school learning" in which students supplement their as-
signed readings by "a variety of sources, from scholarly articles to commercial outlines").
110. Cf. Dickson, Dilemmas, STUDENT LAW., Jan. 1988, at 44, 45. The article notes:
John Gardner, the late novelist and critic, suggests that the best, most important writing
invariably has one indispensable quality- the writer seeing with his or her own eyes. In law
exams, that's exactly what doesn't happen. Instead of seeing with our own eyes, we spend our
limited time desperately trying to see with the eyes of our teachers. There are exceptions, but
for most of us, the underlying aim is to write down what we fondly imagine our professors
want to hear.
Id.
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peated by many of our beginning students of the law.
In the classroom, law professors can be divided into two categories:
the "lecturers," who attempt to cover and explicate lots of doctrinal
rules; and the "challengers," who try to raise provocative questions
about specific aspects of cases, problems, doctrinal rules, and more fun-
damental legal and social theories.""' In either case, the classroom text
that is developed will shift frequently and implicitly between assigned
and unassigned texts such as casebook excerpts, the social and doctrinal
contexts of the casebook opinions, and the professor's (or profession's)
explanations, interpretations, and evaluations of these multiple texts.,, 2
Further, the limitations on classroom time and the basic nature of oral
discourse in large groups, which requires an essential simplicity and
repetition for effective communication, limit the possibilities for devel-
oping complex law school texts in an integrated or a comprehensible
fashion. To be sure, many of us may assay painstakingly careful lec-
tures over complex doctrine and believe that our lectures are under-
stood by our listeners. But the only good evidence of this understanding
is in the Blue Book exams we read, and this evidence surely contradicts
these beliefs.
Thus, it appears that the student of legal language, unlike most
students of foreign languages, is faced with the bewildering task of mas-
tering many fragmented, disjunctive, and subterranean texts as the ba-
sic means of preparing for final examinations, as well as the practice of
law. Some students, by nature or prior training, may have an instinct
for organizing these texts into a structure that will support effective
issue spotting, rule specification, and rule application on Blue Book ex-
ams. Many students, however, do not have this capacity, especially at
the beginning of their legal studies. Yet legal education continues to
create, indeed appears to celebrate, the confusions and mysteries that
students experience as a result of the fragmentation and disjunctions in
basic law school texts."'
The multiplicity of fragmented texts is complicated further because
111. See, e.g., Rutter, Designing and Teaching the First-Degree Law Curriculum, 37 U. CIN.
L. REv. 7, 26-36 (1968).
112. Cf. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 76-77 (1960) (describing five levels of case dis-
cussion in law schools and advising readers to be clear about the shifts between levels); S. NOAKES,
TIMELY READING (1988) (arguing that literary critics often fail to maintain a clear distinction be-
tween the exegesis of a literary text, which attempts to understand an author's intentions, and the
interpretation of a text, which presents the interpreter's meaning, in the discussion and criticism
of literature); Bergman, The War Between the States (Of Mind): Oral Versus Textual Reasoning,
40 ARK. L. REv. 505 (1987) (contrasting the relatively straightforward qualities of a "text-free"
mode of reasoning with the more complex qualities of the lawyer's "text-bound" mode of
reasoning).
113. See, e.g., D. KENNEDY, supra note 103, at 15-17.
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students and professors tend to read these texts in radically different
ways. We can begin perhaps to appreciate the radical diversity of read-
ings by noting three basic ways of reading a text.114 Some readers
"dominate" a text by merely trying to incorporate bits of the text into
their pre-existing frameworks of knowledge. Others "submit" to a text
by simply absorbing the words and storyline of the text without apply-
ing critical thought. Still other, more sophisticated readers appear to
read texts "dialogically" in an attempt both to understand and learn
from the text and to relate this learning to the reader's more general
knowledge; in other words, this reader attempts both to interpret and
to evaluate the text in some critical fashion. These dialogic readers per-
haps can be further divided into two categories that are suggested by
Jerome Bruner's distinction between "bottom up" readers, who concen-
trate on the concrete narrative of a text, and "top down" readers, who
focus on analyzing a text from some theoretical perspective. 115 In
Bruner's view, both modes of reading and thought are invaluable to un-
derstanding and action, yet these two quite different modes of thought
may be irreducible to any common denominator." 6
Another complicating factor in the reading of complex texts is that
each reader will bring her specific perspectives, frameworks, and infor-
mation to bear in understanding the text. These perspectives,
frameworks, and information are based on diverse factors such as the
individual's cultural background, previous education, and gender. 117
Comparably diverse readings of law school texts might be expected as a
natural result. In sum, different ways of reading and understanding
texts and the many fragmented and discontinuous texts in law school
work create the danger of a radical or incoherent pluralism in law
school communication and knowledge.
A major purpose of classroom work, of course, is to shape these
multiple texts and multiple readings in ways that can help to establish
the legal profession's shared understandings of legal doctrine, conven-
tions, and skills. More specifically, we might say that a primary purpose
of classroom discussions is to develop some integrated or coherent text
from which students can learn and prepare for Blue Book exams. Cer-
tainly students interested in earning high grades and law professors try-
ing to establish objectively fair examinations should share this
114. See Flynn, Gender and Reading, in GENDER AND READING 267, 267-70 (E. Flynn & P.
Schweikart eds. 1986).
115. J. BRUNER, Two Modes of Thought, in ACTUAL MINDS, POSSMLE WORLDS 11, 12-13 (1986)
[hereinafter AcTuAL MINDS].
116. Id. at 11.
117. See Crawford & Chaffin, The Reader's Construction of Meaning: Cognitive Research on
Gender and Comprehension, in GENDER AND READING, supra note 114, at 3.
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perspective.118
Ironically, our classroom texts are probably much less coherent
than we think because of our failure to appreciate the fragmented na-
ture of law school texts and the many ways of reading texts. In effect,
an identical starting line in the race for law school grades is simply not
possible in view of this fragmentation, discontinuity, and diversity.
Moreover, our attempts to create shared understandings about legal
doctrine, skills, and conventions are based heavily on oral communica-
tion in classrooms with many students, which is an ineffective way of
establishing understandings about complex and tacit professional
knowledge. The professor's oral presentation in the classroom must be
aimed at a general and relatively simple level in order to be effective
communication. Any understanding of the more complex and more con-
troversial aspects of legal thought is likely to be ignored, suppressed, or
misunderstood by law faculty and students alike, because complex and
controversial thought is best expressed and understood by careful indi-
vidual reading and writing about such thought."9 Unfortunately, de-
spite our intentions, our classroom work tends to ignore and destroy the
complexity, controversy, contradiction, imagination, and individuality
that are so valuable to the practice of law. 20
Importantly, the classroom text provides only some of the informa-
tion and few of the skills that a student needs for Blue Book exams. As
noted earlier, the assigned readings and classroom discussions in most
law school courses are concerned with the explanation, interpretation,
and evaluation of pivotal cases that establish contemporary doctrine,
while the final exam is typically concerned with the conventional appli-
cation of doctrine to new and unexpected "borderline" situations.' 2 '
The daily work in most law school courses thus fails to provide models,
instruction, or practice for the issue spotting and rule applications re-
quired for Blue Book exams. The classroom text provides the objective
bases for an examination, the doctrinal rules and case holdings that
may be used as relevant legal authorities; the students, however, are left
largely on their own to acquire the skills of issue spotting and rule ap-
plication in particular fields.
To be sure, some instruction, practice, and feedback to help pre-
pare for Blue Book exams can be provided by the "problem method" of
118. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 277-78.
119. See Kissam, supra note 8; see also supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
120. See D. SCHON, supra note 87, at 14-18; Amsterdam, supra note 65; Llewellyn, The Cur-
rent Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDuc. 211 (1948); Pipkin, Law School Instruction in
Professional Responsibility: A Curricular Paradox, 1979 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 247, 250-52.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
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teaching or by discussion of "hypotheticals" in the classroom. 122 These
approaches, however, though more promising than others, also have sig-
nificant limitations. First, class discussion of problems and hypotheti-
cals rarely tests students in issue spotting because the major issues
usually will be clear from the context of related assignments and class
discussions. Second, class discussion of these problems is oral, which
limits the possibilities for complex discussion or dialogue and for effec-
tive feedback on individual performances. Third, it appears that these
methods in any event are not employed in a systematic or pervasive
way in modern legal education. The use of hypothetical problems as
part of the case method is a time-honored tradition, but our modern
emphasis on covering rules, often by professorial monologue,12 suggests
that the use of hypotheticals has declined considerably. The problem
method is a more recent invention, but little evidence exists to suggest
that this method has become pervasive or that it is employed fre-
quently with writing exercises.12 In sum, fragmented law school texts
and discontinuities between these texts and Blue Book exams suggest
that most law students face their examinations with substantial uncer-
tainty about what they should know and do.
D. The Impact of Exams on Law School Work
Let us now consider the relationships that run from Blue Book ex-
ams backwards to law school course work and forward to subsequent
exams. This analysis also uncovers substantial discontinuities and hid-
den relationships, and these relationships, like those discussed above,
violate basic learning principles and serve the private interests of law
faculty.
Law students receive little feedback about their performance on
law school examinations, and they receive almost no feedback about
how they might be able to spot issues, specify rules, and apply rules
more effectively and more quickly on future examinations. The feed-
back received by most students consists of their grades in particular
courses and perhaps the general distribution of grades in these courses.
These abstract symbols fail to provide a specific explanation of the
122. See, e.g., Ogden, The Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 654
(1984); Zarr, Learning Criminal Law Through The Whole Case Method, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 697
(1984).
123. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
124. See R STEVENs, supra note 97, at 215; supra note 45, 123 and accompanying text; see
also Ogden, supra note 122 (urging more extensive use of the problem method, in part to train
students in examination skills, but noting that this method is probably of limited value in large
classes). The modern emphasis on doctrinal explication in the classroom reduces the possibilities
for frequent or pervasive use of either hypothetical cases or the problem method.
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quality of one's performance, other than providing some rough indica-
tion of a student's place in the school's class ranking hierarchy and her
relative skills at issue spotting and rule application under time con-
straints. 28 Of course, students are free to ask faculty members for in-
struction on examination skills and for more substantive feedback on
their examination performances, but these opportunities are likely to be
limited for several reasons.
First, relatively few law students actually ask for this kind of assis-
tance. 126 This behavior is consistent with the law school tradition of
1127 wtsubstantial student deference to law professors, and with the psycho-
logical need of many students to guard against the demonstration of
any "unprofessional" lack of expertise.128 This situation is also consis-
tent with the intuitive sense of many students that the basic examina-
tion skills rest mostly on natural talents and that these skills are not
directly important to the practice of law.129
Second, when students do seek our help, the conversations are fre-
quently diverted into channels that fail to provide effective feedback to
the student, despite our best intentions. Most of these conversations
probably result in the professor explaining or defending a grade in
terms of the student's relative "point scores" on particular questions, or
in understandable if nonproductive expressions of anger and hostility
by the student about a disappointing grade, or in guarding against any
demonstration of an "unprofessional" lack of expertise by either profes-
sor or student. Productive conversations characterized by a genuine ap-
peal for help and a discussion of the skills of internalizing doctrine,
identifying issues, and applying doctrine are likely to be rare because
these conversations require a substantial investment of time and sub-
stantial risks for both participants.
Third, the successful writing of law school exams requires a sub-
stantial amount of tacit knowledge; this is something professors know
and do but cannot say. 3 ' Thus, law professors are not in a good posi-
tion to say much at all about how individual students might perform
more effectively on law school exams. What professors can say concerns
only the explanation of doctrine and the explanation of how they ap-
plied their "objective" grading scales. These explanations, however, are
not the same as educating a student in issue spotting or applying rules
125. See Nickles, supra note 4, at 425, 454-59, 463-66.
126. See id. at 426, 437-38, 463-64.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
128. See Stone, supra note 71, at 398-401, 423-27; Watson, supra note 92, at 124, 131; Com-
ment, supra note 59, at 1202-04.
129. See Mohr & Rodgers, supra note 74, at 416.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
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to unexpected fact situations.
Law professors could offer students practice and more practice, es-
pecially in the form of writing exercises, on the same rules and issues
and same kinds of fact situations with which we ultimately test and
evaluate our students.131 This process will appear to most professors
(and to many students) to be too time consuming and too costly, partic-
ularly in view of the large classes that dominate the law school land-
scape. Further, most law professors may be unwilling or unable to
employ teaching assistants, peer review of student work, and other less
formal kinds of writing exercises and feedback, either because of fund-
ing shortages or because of their belief that these less formal procedures
would constitute an unprofessional delegation of faculty authority to
less experienced persons.3 2 In sum, most law schools are unlikely to
provide much if any practice or individualized feedback to their stu-
dents on basic examination skills as long as the Blue Book system con-
trols our thinking about legal education and legal thought.
Despite the absence of useful feedback, Blue Book exams do influ-
ence the daily work of students and professors. The students' excessive
attention to treatises, case outlines, and the classroom texts of their
professors' words, at the expense of learning by careful reading of as-
signed texts and participation in classroom dialogue, has been noted or
decried by many observers. 133 This phenomenon, however, is under-
standable, if not entirely rational, in view of the lack of instruction,
practice, feedback, and student knowledge about what is expected on
final exams. It is also understandable in view of the incoherent qualities
of assigned readings and classroom discussions from a Blue Book per-
spective, which is the student's primary perspective. The student un-
derstands, if implicitly, that Blue Book exams require something more
than what is provided by daily course work; this understanding is trans-
lated into treatise reading, extensive outlining, and memorizing rules. If
we want students to engage in the more individualized, risky, and frus-
trating process of carefully reading complex texts and enthusiastically
participating in classroom dialogues, we need to develop a more plural-
istic examination system that encourages and rewards this sort of
131. See Feinman & Feldman, supra note 4, at 528-44; Motley, supra note 4, at 749-60; see
also Bean, Writing Assignments in Law School Classes, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 276 (1987); Kahn, Pro-
posal for a Modified Casebook Technique, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 475 (1973); Kissam, supra note 8, at
164-68 (describing and recommending the use of short, ungraded writing exercises to help teach
doctrinal courses).
132. See Kissam, supra note 8, at 165-66.
133. See, e.g., S. TuRow, supra note 30, at 46-47 (describing typical negative reactions to or a
pretended ignorance of student use of treatises and commercial outlines by Harvard law profes-
sors); A. VANDERBILT, supra note 25, at 80-82 (warning law students against relying too heavily
upon commercial course outlines).
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behavior.
Law professors often seem indifferent about the value of Blue Book
exams for the purpose of actually learning law. We tend to think that
we teach many things that cannot be tested or will not be covered on
our Blue Book exams, and we certainly have considerable distaste for
reading examination essays.8 4 This indifference, however, may disguise
some rather strong relationships between Blue Book exams and the
daily work of law professors. If the modern professor contemplates the
kind of teaching that will generate many distinct grades that can be
explained easily and quickly to inquiring students, she is likely to in-
vent a teaching style that concentrates on covering the many objective
bases, such as the doctrinal rules and case holdings, that form parts
(but only parts) of answers to possible examination questions. This
style will allow the faculty member to write wide-ranging examination
questions and then point to the objective bases covered in class as the
authoritative basis for each of the right answers demanded by a com-
prehensive exam. In other words, this desire to "prepare" students for
the Blue Book process is likely to cause the extended lecturing and rule
coverage that apparently has become the norm in the modern law
school classroom. 1' 5 This Blue Book connection thus reinforces the
faculty member's interests in developing a specialized doctrinal knowl-
edge and earning favorable student evaluations, which interests are also
served by providing a clear explanation of doctrine in the classroom. 138
Unfortunately, at least for students, the explanation of doctrine covers
only the objective bases of Blue Book answers. Law professors thus
avoid the frustrating, more individualized, and time-consuming process
of instructing students on the skills that are required for Blue Book
exams, to say nothing of avoiding the teaching of more sophisticated
legal skills.
E. From Exams to Practice
As noted previously, relationships between Blue Book exams and
the practice of law include preparing students to take state licensure
exams and screening students for employers."3 7 Some more complicated
134. See, e.g., Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1086 (1986);
Christie, The Recruitment of Law Faculty, 1987 DuKe L.J. 306, 310, 315; see also Vernon, Ethics
in Academe-Afton Dekanal, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 205, 205 (1984) (describing Professor Afton
Dekanal, a much traveled and much respected law professor, who "was killed by a bolt of lightning
immediately after having taught the last class of the semester and before he had the opportunity
to write or to grade the final examination, achieving the dream most of us have").
135. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
136. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 265-66, 271-75.
137. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
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relationships also deserve attention. One is the idea that Blue Book ex-
ams are necessary, or at least helpful, to ensure that students acquire
the doctrine and skills needed to begin the practice of law. A second
relationship concerns the limited use of the examination functions in
most legal practice. A third is that Blue Book exams teach a model of
thinking and writing, the paradigm of good paragraph thinking, that
may prove detrimental for many lawyers, their clients, and the public at
large.
At the start of their careers, lawyers should understand the law's
basic grammar (i.e., conventional reasoning skills) and its basic vocabu-
lary (i.e., major doctrines) in order to practice effectively. Blue Book
exams require, or at least encourage, most students to engage in com-
prehensive reviews of the rules and cases in many subjects; thus, one
might believe that the Blue Book system is necessary to prepare stu-
dents for the practice of law.
This belief, however, is questionable. Does this review process en-
able most students to acquire an adequate understanding of the law's
basic grammar and vocabulary for the purposes of legal practice?
Faculty assessments of general student performance on Blue Book ex-
ams suggest that most students do not acquire an effective understand-
ing of the law's basic grammar and vocabulary from the Blue Book
system. 13 8 Although this review process might generate an adequate
practical understanding that simply is not shown on Blue Book exams,
proliferating complaints about unskilled new lawyers and the develop-
ment of law school clinics to improve the students' practical training
suggest that this is not the case. 13 9 Furthermore, analysis of Blue Book
exams and classroom work suggests that pre-examination reviews cause
many students to concentrate excessively on acquiring a vocabulary of
doctrinal rules (the objective bases of examination answers) without ob-
taining an adequate understanding of the law's basic grammar. 40 The
review process created by the Blue Book system thus distorts the stu-
dent's acquiring a proper balance of grammar and vocabulary that
would best support effective law practice.
Could alternative educational techniques promote the acquisition
138. See, e.g., Feinman & Feldman, supra note 51, at 881-82; Motley, supra note 4, at 723;
see also Mudd & LaTrielle, Professional Competence: A Study of New Lawyers, 49 MoNT. L. REV.
11, 26-27 (1988) (reporting with some surprise that practitioners had awarded new lawyers in
Idaho and Montana relatively "low marks" on the new lawyers' knowledge of substantive law).
139. See Lawyer Competency: The Role of the Law School, 1979 ABA SEC. LEGAL EDuc. &
ADMissioNs B. 1; Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency,
1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 695; Mudd & LaTrielle, supra note 138.
140. Cf. Motley, supra note 4, at 729, 737 (noting that Blue Book exams are teaching the
skill of memorization with a special intensity, especially to weaker students who are likely to con-
centrate on memorization in the absence of effective feedback).
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of a proper balance between grammar and vocabulary? Careful daily
readings, for example, especially "critical reading" in which the student
reads with some external perspective, might be sufficient to develop
an adequate vocabulary for the initial practice of law.4 2 These readings
could be encouraged by changing the structure of class discussions," "
and they also might be supplemented by employing frequent, short, and
ungraded writing exercises. 4 Written exercises also could be used to
focus student attention on the acquisition of basic reasoning skills.' 5 In
sum, any claim that the current Blue Book system is necessary or even
helpful to prepare students for the practice of law is unsubstantiated.
This claim carries the weight of tradition perhaps, but little else.
A deeper problem in the relationship between Blue Book exams
and practice results because the basic examination skills (doctrinal in-
ternalization, issue identification, rule specification, and rule applica-
tion under time constraints) are only a small part of the knowledge and
skills upon which lawyers rely in the practice of law. e14 As a result, most
law school training, especially exam preparation, constitutes limited ed-
ucation for the practice of law. Although this training may be an effi-
cient or inexpensive way to educate beginners, students may misin-
terpret the relationship between exams and the practice of law and fail
to reap optimal benefits from present legal education.
Most students understand, at least intuitively and perhaps explic-
itly after clerking in law firms, that Blue Book skills are not closely
related to the day-to-day work of most law practices, despite the impor-
tance of these skills in the practice of law overall. If this understanding
causes students to surrender their attempts at mastering examination
skills or, more simply, to abandon the careful reading of assigned
141. See generally Grinols, Critical Reading and Learning in College, in CRITICAL THINKING:
READING ACROSS THE CURmCULUM 21-31 (A. Grinols ed. 1985).
142. See White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What a Law School Ought (and
Ought Not) to Be, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 164 (1986). The author argues:
The firit assumption that should go is that everything of importance in the field, or for the
exam, will be covered in class. We should feel free to treat our students as grown-ups, able to
read and think on their own. We should give them books and articles they might read before
the course begins (and perhaps even examine them on that reading as a kind of qualification
for the course); we should identify material we expect them to read on their own during the
course, including casebook material; we should offer them guidance to useful summaries of
doctrine and the like.
Id.
143. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 319-20; Kissam, supra note 8, at 152-57 (describing possi-
ble classroom techniques to help generate critical thinking and reading by law students in both
basic doctrinal courses and seminars).
144. See Kissam, supra note 8, at 157, 164-65.
145. See Bean, supra note 131.
146. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 112, at 105-22; F. ZEAANs & V. ROSENBLUM, THE
MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1981); Macaulay, supra note 17, at 506-12.
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materials and careful reviewing prior to examinations, much of the edu-
cational value of the Blue Book system will have been lost. Unfortu-
nately, the evidence of considerable burn-out, despair, and malaise
among second- and third-year students, including many high-ranking
students, 7 suggests that this misinterpretation is pervasive. Moreover,
a simple exhortation to students to work harder or a professor's admin-
istration of company punishment by lowering a course grading curve is
unlikely to produce any desirable results. Students are likely to perceive
that harder work will neither produce higher grades-the mystery and
mandatory grading curve of Blue Book exams ensure this result-nor
prepare them directly for the practice of law.1 8 To reduce the malaise
of law students instead requires change in the law school's basic system
of social control, and this change should include modifications to both
our examination practices and our classroom practices.14 9
We also must consider the consequences of good paragraph think-
ing. If legal education has a lasting impact on the minds and hearts of
lawyers, what might this be? This impact is likely to include the think-
ing and writing style that students have employed to survive or succeed
on Blue Book exams, for Blue Book exams certainly represent the ma-
jor focus and major traumatic experience of law school life for most
students. This thinking and writing style, the paradigm of good para-
graph thinking, may work well for writing Blue Books, but it appears to
have some substantial adverse effects on other kinds of legal practice.
Consider first the heavily criticized styles of lawyers' writing in ap-
pellate briefs, memoranda, law review articles, and legal treatises. 150
Might not these styles be associated with Blue Book writing, especially
the writing of our more successful students? For example, appellate
briefs often seem to labor on endlessly, raising issue after issue, often in
the conclusory or one-sided manner that many lawyers mistake for per-
suasive rhetoric, without making the critical attempt to identify and
emphasize the important and difficult issues that a court must consider
in making its decision in a hard case. 5 ' Similarly, a common style of
law review writing is single-minded comprehensiveness and exhaustive-
ness. This style features long, loosely related paragraphs; lengthy, com-
147. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 4, at 328-29, 332; Stone, supra note 71, at 424-26.
148. See Cramton, supra note 4, at 329; Comment, supra note 59, at 1204-10.
149. See discussion infra Part VI.
150. See, e.g., Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law Reviews!, 27 ARiz. L. REv. 317 (1985); Pregerson,
The Seven Sins of Appellate Brief Writing and Other Transgressions, 34 UCLA L. REv. 431
(1986); Stark, Why Lawyers Can't Write, 97 HAv. L. REV. 1389 (1984).
151. Judge Richard Posner made this point in a recent discussion with the University of
Kansas law faculty. Cf. Pregerson, supra note 150, at 433-37 (noting that appellate briefs often
suffer from excessive length, boring qualities, incoherence, string citations, and abusive language
that is mistaken for good rhetoric).
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plex sentences seeking endless precision about everything; and lengthy,
complex "textual footnotes" to tie up loose ends.152 The apparent pur-
pose of this writing style is to prove that the writer has researched
every possible doctrinal source for resolving a legal issue, has thought of
every possible argument about an issue, and has constructed unim-
peachable resolutions of each imaginable issue. 153 There is, undoubt-
edly, a value in thinking this way about legal problems, at least in part
or initially; but this thinking/writing style is quite difficult to read and
often obscures or simply misses the insights that might persuade a
thoughtful reader of the writer's position. In effect, this style of think-
ing/writing generates a boredom and tedium quite similar to the bore-
dom and tedium about which law professors complain in reading Blue
Books.5 Thus, is not the examination prose of students, the words by
which future lawyers work out and express their initial understanding
of law, the best available explanation for the ponderous thinking/writ-
ing style of so many lawyers? 55
Consider next the inclination of many practicing lawyers to rely on
specific facts-the facts of cases, precedents, or legislative histories-at
the expense of more general ideas, principles, values, and contexts that
also have an important role to play in the construction of arguments to
help solve the complex problems of life and law. 58 This orientation to-
152. See, e.g., Nowak, supra note 150 (describing the excessive length and doctrine-laden
style of most law review writing); Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936)
(describing the two things wrong with law review articles, their style and substance, and character-
izing law review writing as "spinach").
153. See Farber, The Zapp Complex, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 13, 14-16 (1988) (noting the
propensity of law review writers to try to say the last words on subjects, to silence all conceivable
critics, and thus necessarily to write exhaustively); cf. Stone, supra note 71, at 403 (stating that
law professors "have internalized a legal standard of perfection which requires that they anticipate
every possible counterargument before they advance a positive thesis of any sort").
154. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
156. See, e.g., B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLic 227-39 (1977) (reporting substan-
tial perceptions among clients, including multiple users and clients satisfied with their services,
that lawyers needlessly complicate problems, are indifferent to and ineffective at communicating
with clients, and are indifferent to ethical matters); R. DWORKIN, SERIOUSLY, supra note 6, at 14-45
(claiming that many lawyers misunderstand law as a model of empirically based rules); Griswold,
Law Schools and Human Relations, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 217 (stating that lawyers are often defi-
cient in human relations skills and law schools should provide training in these skills); Pregerson,
supra note 150, at 435-36 (noting that appellate advocates often misunderstand their audience and
fail to provide the most helpful arguments for resolving appellate cases); Amsterdam, supra note
65, at 612-13. One commentator has suggested that
[l]egal education at the end of the twentieth century was too narrow. ., because it failed to
develop in students ways of thinking within and about the role of lawyers-methods of criti-
cal analysis, planning, and decisionmaking. In the twenty-first century .. . a major function
of law school is to give students systematic training in effective techniques for learning law
from the experience of practicing law.
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wards concrete facts has a substantial value, but it is often excessive.
Such excess is shown, for example, in the legendary practice of "string
citations" in both briefs and the footnotes of scholarly writing.157 It is
also shown by the overfidelity of many lawyers to the words of doctrinal
authorities, by lawyers' simultaneous inattention to the contexts or em-
bedded principles of these authorities, and by the general and pervasive
misunderstanding of law as an empirical rather than interpretive and
argumentative enterprise. 158 This overreliance on fact and disdain for
complex and less certain values is, of course, embedded in the Blue
Book paradigm of good paragraph thinking.
Consider finally the fragmentation of thought and analysis that is
required by the paradigm of good paragraph thinking. This model re-
quires the law student to break down examination problems into many
fragments in light of the conventional rules-the smaller the fragments
and the larger their number the better. This paradigm, however, does
not require much attention to the integration or interpretation of com-
plex authorities or complex facts, nor does it require the student to
think much about a client's possible range of values or alternative legal
solutions to adjudication. 59 Is it surprising, then, that common refrains
in the modern criticism of practicing lawyers are that we are "too legal-
istic," too rarely appreciative of the personal or social values that are
implicated in our work, and too often incapable of integrating complex
materials in innovative, imaginative, and persuasive ways? 60 Again, is
not the best available explanation of these characteristics-to the ex-
tent they are explained by legal education-the paradigm that gener-
ates successful Blue Book answers?
IV. WHAT BLuE BOOKS Do To PERSONS
This Part considers the personal context of the Blue Book system,
or, in other words, the ways in which individuals react to and interpret
their Blue Book experiences. This Part examines first the relationships
between Blue Book exams and students and then the quite different
and more permanent relationships between Blue Book exams and law
professors.
157. See Pregerson, supra note 150, at 435-36 (on string citations in appellate briefs); Rodell,
supra note 152, at 40-41 (on string citations in law review footnotes). See generally Austin, Foot-
notes as Product Differentiation, 40 VANi. L. REv. 1131 (1987); Barrett, To Read This Story in
Full, Don't Forget to See the Footnotes, Wall St. J., May 10, 1988, at 1, col. 4 (describing the
practice of and motivations for legal footnoting).
158. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 6; R DWORKIN, SERIOUSLY, supra note 6, at 14-45, 81-130.
159. See discussion supra Part H C.
160. See, e.g., Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry Into the Application of
Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 514, 516-30 (1978).
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A. Law Students
"[T]he body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a sub-
jected body"
-M. Foucault161
Student interpretations of the Blue Book experience have three
dimensions. The most obvious is to interpret law school grades and
class rank as indicators of a student's general employment opportuni-
ties. A second is to interpret the examination experience as a model for
law practice and as an indicator of the student's general abilities to per-
form as a lawyer. Finally, for some students Blue Book exams affect the
student's sense of personal identity and development. These dimen-
sions are intertwined, of course, but they should be examined sepa-
rately in order to understand the impact of the Blue Book system on
the lives of individual students.
Law students quickly become aware, if only in a general way, of the
importance that law school grades and class ranks have for employment
opportunities.1 12 The range of these opportunities, to be sure, varies
considerably between national, regional, and local law schools; and indi-
vidual students place varying weights on the value of different employ-
ment opportunities. Nonetheless, at most schools students probably
interpret the employment consequences of grades and class ranks ac-
cording to three categories of achievement. The "winners" are students
who obtain the highest grades, or law review status, and are thus eligi-
ble for the most remunerative and prestigious opportunities that are
available to graduates of that school. The "journeymen" or "role play-
ers" are students with grades in the middle range of the school's class
ranking system; these students are eligible for a relatively broad range
of employment opportunities, but not those most honored by the
school's faculty and students. The "losers" are those students with rela-
tively low grades and class ranks who must struggle to find any profes-
sional employment or, in the case of national schools, to find
professional employment that is commensurate with their
expectations. 163
Many students, perhaps most, seem to interpret the Blue Book ex-
perience only in terms of this employment dimension. This result is un-
derstandable for several reasons: the honors that law schools and the
161. i FOUcAULT, DIscIPLINE, supra note 2, at 26.
162. See Cramton, supra note 4, at 328-29; Comment, supra note 59, at 1209.
163. Cf. D. KENNEDY, supra note 103, at 49-55 (describing the law school's "hierarchical
structuring" of prospective lawyers); Cramton, supra note 4, at 328-29 (stating that "[f]irst-year
grades control the distribution of goodies: honors, law review, job placement, and, because of the
importance placed on these matters by the law-school culture, even the student's sense of personal
worth").
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legal profession formally and informally award to those with the highest
grades;1" the emphasis on interviews for summer clerkships, which for
many will begin during the first year of law school;6 5 and the non-
specific career expectations of most law students, which can produce an
intense concentration on grades as the only apparent means to position
oneself for the very best opportunities.6 6 The consequences of this fo-
cus on the employment dimension, however, are unfortunate. On the
one hand, winners sometimes can adopt an attitude of "presumptuous
self-importance"'' e7 and, because of a realization that they have mas-
tered the Blue Book paradigm, an attitude of considerable indifference
to daily classroom work, clinics, and seminars in upper-class years that
could provide a more sophisticated development of their skills. 6 ' On
the other hand, many disappointed members of the journeyman and
loser classes develop attitudes of hostility, isolation, emotional detach-
ment, and malaise.' This disappointment reinforces the lack of inter-
est in legal studies that appears to result from the mystification and
frustration of the examination experience. 170 These attitudes, like the
very different attitudes of winners, lead many students away from the
rigors of daily classroom work, clinics, and seminars that could promote
the development of their skills.
The competitive grading and material consequences of the Blue
Book system also work to produce a strong sense of individualism and
isolation from others in each of the three categories of student
achievers. The individualism and isolation result from the sense that
one's grades have been obtained by one's own efforts (for neither the
professors nor assigned readings will be perceived to have helped one do
well on Blue Book exams) and the understanding that law school grades
result from an individual's competition with her opponents in a law
164. See sources cited supra note 163.
165. See A. KANTER, supra note 103, at 97-101.
166. See Boyer & Cramton, American Legal Education: An Agenda for Research and Re-
form, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 221, 258-59 (1974); Stone, supra note 71, at 398-401, 423-28 (describing
law students at the Ericksonian stage of resolution of their personal identities and the related
stresses on law students that are produced by law school teaching methods, competition, and
grades).
167. Cf. Freeman, A Critical Legal Look at Corporate Practice, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 315, 316
(1987) (promising a denunciation of the "presumptuous self-importance" that is associated with
the corporate practice of law).
168. Cf. Rosenkranz, Law Review's Empire, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 859, 899-911 (1988) (stating
that the law review experience of high-ranking students is an illusory though time-consuming
experience).
169. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 4, at 328-29, 332; Stone, supra note 71, at 415-16, 424-27.
A student once described these feelings to me, sadly, as "the field hand mentality."
170. See supra text accompanying notes 106-49.
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school class.1 71 The isolation and individualism tend to limit collabora-
tive work among students and between students and faculty in clinics,
seminars, and workshops. 172 These characteristics also help to engender
the individualistic ideologies of legal doctrine and practice. 73
Probably all students, either consciously or unconsciously, also in-
terpret their examination experience and grades as a model of good le-
gal practice and as an evaluation of their abilities to practice law. This
dimension of interpreting Blue Book exams undoubtedly bears some re-
lationship to the realities of legal practice and may serve certain values,
but it also seems subject to pervasive misinterpretation by students.
The winners of examination contests, and many journeymen as well,
appear to develop strong if implicit attachments to the various mental
tendencies that can be associated with the paradigm of good paragraph
thinking. In other words, students who succeed on Blue Book exams are
likely to develop an instinct for division, order, and logic as the model
for all legal practice. These students discern that quick, narrow think-
ing is viewed as superior ability and can provide access to opportunities
and the applause of others in the profession. These instincts, of course,
can be valuable in some situations, but they will be less helpful in many
others." 4
At the same time, many students among the journeyman and loser
classes develop considerable doubt about their potential qualities as
practicing lawyers as a result of their Blue Book experiences. In some
cases this doubt may be justified, but in many cases it is not. This
doubt occurs because students understandably interpret their grades as
a kind of absolute statement about overall professional ability rather
than as a statement of relative examination productivity, which is what
law school grades represent. These doubts may not survive law school,
but while they persist they are unfortunate psychological features of the
law school experience and probably affect the students' learning in
many adverse ways. In particular, these doubts may corrode the self-
confidence, self-awareness, and reflective capacities that professional
practice demands and that effective legal education should be promot-
171. See Mohr & Rodgers, supra note 74, at 420; Rosenkranz, supra note 168, at 865; cf.
Stone, supra note 71, at 415-16 (attributing the "unpleasant quality of interpersonal relations
among students" to the autocratic nature of the law school's Socratic method).
172. See, e.g., D. KENNEDY, supra note 103, at 65; Pickard, supra note 71, at 283; Rosenkranz,
supra note 168, at 865; Comment, supra note 59, at 1202-04.
173. See generally D. KENNEDY, supra note 103.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 150-60; cf. Riesman, Law School: Critical Scholar-
ship vs. Professional Education, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 110, 116 (1982) (stating that law school at its
worst provides training in an "onmicompetent arrogance" about the quick learning abilities of
lawyers).
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ing rather than defeating.1 5
Finally, many students appear to interpret law school grades as an
implicit measure of self-worth and personal identity. Professor Alan
Stone has described an "identity crisis" that is faced by many young
law students.1 7 This crisis appears to result from both the general pro-
cess of maturation and the special law school environment that features
limited knowledge about professional practice and roles, ambitious but
general student expectations, and an intense competition for the high-
est law school grades.' 7 In this situation it is not surprising that many
students focus solely on the employment dimension of grades, experi-
ence large amounts of stress (no matter what their grades are),'17 8 and
implicitly misinterpret their law school grades and indicated profes-
sional roles as measures of personhood and self-worth.
In sum, an excessive focus on the employment dimension and mis-
interpretations of law school exams and grades may serve the social
function of legitimizing hierarchies in the legal profession and in our
law schools. 17 9 Of equal importance, in my view, is that this focus and
these misinterpretations often turn law schools into grim and inhumane
institutions that are much less conducive to effective learning than
other kinds of educational institutions.' 80
B. Law Faculty
"You are or become what you read"
-H. Bloom'81
Law professors also interpret the Blue Book experience. We do this
explicitly by expressing views about student performance and about our
own personal experiences in reading and grading Blue Books. We inter-
pret the Blue Book experience implicitly in the course of writing, ad-
ministering, reading, grading, and explaining law school exams and
grades. Moreover, because professors engage in this process over longer
periods of time, their interpretations may have more profound conse-
quences, both personally and socially, than the interpretations of
students.
Law professors generally hold dismal views of student performance
175. See Himmelstein, supra note 160, at 590-91.
176. Stone, supra note 71, at 398-401, 423-27.
177. Id.
178. See Benjamin, Kaszniak, Sales & Shanfield, The Role of Legal Education in Producing
Psychological Stress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 225.
179. See generally D. KENNEDY, supra note 103.
180. See generally Himmelstein, supra note 160.
181. H. BLOOM, KABBALAH AND CRITICISM 96 (1975), quoted in Kolodny, A Map for Reread-
ing: Gender and the Interpretation of Literary Texts, in E. SHOWALTER, supra note 77, at 59.
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on Blue Books."8 2 This perspective breeds a corrosive negativism, or at
least pervasive skepticism, about the general intellectual and profes-
sional abilities of most students. 183 Perhaps this negativism is a kind of
defense mechanism that disguises personal and collective insecurities
about the quality of our teaching, which after all is reflected in if not
recorded by student performance on our exams.' Perhaps this negativ-
ism stems from the law school ideology that professors are "ideal
judges" who must judge many things deficient in order to reaffirm this
ideology and the related desire to be recognized as professional ex-
perts.185 Whatever the cause, our negative attitudes towards the intel-
lectual and professional qualities of most students can hardly be a good
thing for either democratic or effective legal education. With this atti-
tude, we are more likely to disempower students with the brilliance of
our own discourse than we are to listen with care and respect to the
expressions of most students, who as beginners in a professional prac-
tice are likely to (and should) make mistakes frequently.
With this negative attitude, law professors seem to reify law school
grades, which represent only the relative speed and ability of students
at basic legal analysis, as symbols of more general intellectual, imagina-
tive, and prudential qualities. This reification, of course, serves as a
powerful self-affirmation of our personal worth and talents because we
bestow accolades upon an elite group of students who reflect ourselves
by earning the highest grades on Blue Books. If we judge students in
this fashion, however, are we not also likely to confuse quick and pro-
ductive conventional analysis with many of the broader qualities that
the entire legal community should be looking for in future lawyers?'
As law professors, we also interpret Blue Books by incorporating
the experience into our own lives, values, and character. These interpre-
tations are expressed in a limited way by the common professorial com-
plaint of "tedium" or "boredom" in reading so many essays on so many
similar questions.8 7 Implicit interpretations are indicated by professo-
182. See, e.g., Feinman & Feldman, supra note 51, at 881-82; Motley, supra note 4, at 723.
183. See Feinman & Feldman, supra note 51, at 881-82; Watson, supra note 92, at 107-08,
111-12.
184. On the insecurities of contemporary law professors about the quality of their teaching,
see Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA L. REv. 637 (1968); Luban,
Against Autarky, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 176 (1984); Levinson, supra note 3; and Shaffer, Moral Impli-
cations and Effects of Legal Education: Or, Brother Justinian Goes to Law School, 34 J. LEGAL
EiUc. 190 (1984).
185. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 259; Macaulay, supra note 17, at 514.
186. Cf. Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REv. 221 (1988) (con-
trasting the richly pluralistic genres of modem legal scholarship with the quick, productive, and
conventional doctrinal analysis that remains the favorite of many academic legal scholars and their
paradigm for the evaluation of all legal scholarship).
187. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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rial behavior concerning Blue Book exams. For example, the move by
many modern professors to substitute short-answer questions for essay
questions18 8 may simply be a recognition that Blue Book essays are
overwhelmingly boring to read, of little consequence to the practice of
law, and thus simply not worth assigning. Similarly, our marked dis-
taste for and defensiveness in explaining grades to students 18 9 appear to
represent an implicit statement of personal insecurity about the values
of either the Blue Book process or our general teaching philosophies
and methods.
These interpretations of the Blue Book experience may even reflect
something about a law professor's personal character. Professor
Anthony Kronman has recently argued that a process of practical judg-
ment is essential to good legal practice and that this process may help
to constitute the personal character of lawyers. 190 Similarly, could not
the evaluative aspects of the Blue Book experience form an essential
aspect of the professorial role and help to constitute our character? We
do, after all, spend large amounts of time preparing and reading Blue
Book exams,' 9' and these exams also influence the daily law school work
of assigned readings and class discussions.92 Could it be that our bore-
dom in reading Blue Books, our corrosive negativism about the intellec-
tual and professional qualities of most students, and our defensiveness
in explaining examinations to students reflect parallel tendencies in our
own character-tendencies of boredom, corrosive negativism, and deep
insecurity?
More fundamentally, law professors tend to read casebooks, Blue
Book essays, appellate court opinions, legal treatises, and articles ana-
lyzing appellate court opinions. If Harold Bloom's aphorism, recounted
at the beginning of this section, is taken seriously, then reading these
fragmented, partial, and relatively autonomous texts may be shaping
our character and the paradigms of our thought into similarly frag-
mented, partial, and autonomous forms. As law professors, we should
work to avoid these potentially severe consequences of the Blue Book
experience.
188. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 125-32; cf. Stone, supra note 71, at 403-04 (noting
the special vulnerability of law professors to criticism of any kind).
190. Kronman, supra note 40; cf. Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REv. 869 (1988)
(suggesting that an advocate or judge presents herself as a certain kind of character and seeks to
have listeners identify with that kind of character).
191. See Christie, supra note 134, at 315.
192. See discussion supra Part I C.
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V. VALUES AND DISADVANTAGES
This Part summarizes the positive and negative aspects of the cur-
rent Blue Book system. The analysis indicates that Blue Book exams
serve important values and powerful interests, but it also suggests that
these values and interests can be served by modified examination sys-
tems. This analysis also indicates substantial disfunctions of the Blue
Book system that constitute good reasons for modifying our present
practices.
A. Values
The law school class ranking system provides employers with an
approximate measure of the relative productivity and capacity for self-
learning of different students. This measurement constitutes the pri-
mary social value of the Blue Book system. Class ranks appear to pro-
vide a sensible means by which legal employers can screen prospective
employees in ways that limit the employer's search costs and hiring
mistakes. This value, however, is probably much greater for large corpo-
rate firms than for other legal employers. The large firm can obtain
greater economic savings by relying heavily upon class ranks in its hir-
ing practices for several reasons. First, the large firm engages in ex-
tended hiring practices, which require general screening methods.
Second, the large firm places a premium on complex but routine cogni-
tive work by its younger lawyers, 9 ' and Blue Book exams are particu-
larly effective at measuring a law student's aptitude for this kind of
work."" Finally, the large firm has the resources to risk potential mis-
takes in screening prospective employees largely on the basis of law
school grades, and the large firm also can provide graduate training for
new associates in order to compensate for the limited quality of Blue
Book-oriented law school training.
Conversely, smaller firms and other legal employers tend to suffer
from a Blue Book-oriented legal education and an exclusive evaluation
of students based on grades and class ranks. These employers have eco-
nomic and professional interests in hiring law graduates who have re-
ceived more intensive training in legal skills than that which is provided
at most law schools today.195 These firms also have more substantial
interests in obtaining individual evaluations of the quality of students'
practical judgment, common sense, and ability to apply legal skills.
As noted earlier, an adequate class ranking system for the purpose
193. See F. ZEmANs & V. ROSENBLUM, supra note 146, at 130-35; Schwartz, The Reach and
Limits of Legal Education, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 543, 553-54 (1982).
194. See discussion supra Part II.
195. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 193, at 554.
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of sorting law students for large firms probably can be generated by
examination systems that employ fewer Blue Book exams and grading
scales with fewer gradations than those currently used at most
schools."'8 Thus, the value of Blue Book exams in serving the interests
of prospective employers is overstated; this value could be served by a
testing system which is less restrictive of good educational practices.
A second value of the current Blue Book system is that it prepares
students for state licensure exams. 97 It is doubtful, however, that law
students must take so many Blue Book exams during their law school
careers in order to prepare adequately for state bar examinations. Cer-
tainly it is the process of Blue Book exams, quickly amassing large
amounts of complex information and applying the information produc-
tively under time constraints-and not the specific information that is
learned for each Blue Book exam-that primarily prepares students for
state licensure examinations. Thus, fewer Blue Book exams should con-
stitute sufficient practice and preparation for state examinations, at
least for most students.19 8
A third value of Blue Books lies in their effect as a regulatory
mechanism. Blue Books force law students to acquire extensive doctri-
nal knowledge and some instinct for analysis; this knowledge can be
useful in subsequent practice, especially in a lawyer's beginning years.
Such knowledge certainly has value to new lawyers and their employers,
but the importance of Blue Books as a regulatory mechanism in pro-
ducing this knowledge is probably overstated. First, the doctrinal
knowledge acquired by most students as a result of Blue Books is dis-
torted towards the memorization of rules, holdings, and concepts. In
other words, it is distorted towards the acquisition of a vocabulary with
neither adequate grammar to employ this vocabulary nor adequate un-
derstanding of the vocabulary, its uses, and limits.' Second, alterna-
tive means are available through which students could better acquire
doctrinal knowledge and the skill of legal analysis. An alternative teach-
ing and examination system could encourage more careful reading of
196. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
198. But cf. supra notes 98, 100, 101 (noting the relative absence of Blue Book exams in the
curriculum of CUNY Law School, the low pass rate of CUNY graduates on the New York bar
exam, and the resulting pressures on CUNY law faculty and its administration to increase the pass
rate of its law graduates). Note, however, that CUNY's admissions policies favor opportunities for
minorities and other non-traditional students; these students may have neither the time to study
for the bar exam nor the pre-law school exam-taking experience and expertise that are enjoyed by
most traditional law students. These latter factors could also explain the low pass rate of CUNY
graduates on the New York bar exam. See Kleinberg & Barnes, supra note 101, at 29-30.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
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legal doctrine by individual students0 " and improve instruction in ana-
lytical skills by offering written exercises with individualized feed-
back.10 1 Thus, the regulatory values of Blue Book exams do not justify
the present system of Blue Book examinations.
A fourth value of the current Blue Book system lies in the relation-
ships between Blue Book exams and the personal interests of law
faculty and those students who obtain the highest grades. The social
value of these relationships, however, is questionable. Blue Book-ori-
ented education allows law professors to teach relatively large classes
with a minimum level of commitment and maximum demonstration of
their expertise in doctrinal specialties.20 2 These consequences clearly
support the scholarship, consulting, and other professional or personal
interests of faculty. These interests may help to enhance an institu-
tion's reputation, which could serve the interests of all members of the
law school community. Similarly, the Blue Book system promotes the
interests of students who obtain the highest grades. These students will
find the system relatively easy to manage and will receive the attractive
employment opportunities and professional recognition that are be-
stowed on the "very best" law students as a consequence of their high
grades."'
Should these personal interests be taken into account in assessing
the social values of the Blue Book system? These interests are clearly
relevant, but most claims about the broader social values accompanying
these interests (especially the claim that faculty scholarship promotes
the employment of law students) do have an air of easy self-rationaliza-
tion about them.20 4 Moreover, these interests are achieved largely at the
expense of the interests of many students (including those with high
grades) who receive a deficient education as a result of Blue Book domi-
nance over current law school practices. In addition, law professors may
suffer subtle negative effects from administering the Blue Book system.
Therefore, these personal interests should not be given much positive
weight in assessing the social value of Blue Book exams.
200. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
202. See Kissam, supra note 8, at 145-48.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
204. See Vernon, supra note 134, at 206, 210-11. According to Vernon, law professors are
adept at "self-delusion via rationalization." Id. at 206. One rationalization is the self-serving claim
that students benefit materially from institution-building, prestige-enhancing law faculty scholar-
ship. Id. at 210-11.
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B. Disadvantages
The Blue Book system also has several disadvantages. First, the
system overemphasizes memorization and internalization of doctrine at
the expense of developing students' skills by providing supervised prac-
tice and feedback on the performance of these skills. 0 5 Second, oppor-
tunities for other kinds of training are foregone by our commitment to a
monolithic Blue Book system that emphasizes doctrine and rudimen-
tary skills. Law schools could provide more pluralistic learning in doc-
trinal courses if the examination and grading practices were varied.
These opportunities are possible even for large classes and without the
commitment of many additional resources.20 6
Third, particular kinds of students suffer as a result of the system's
objectivism and its relentless "norm referencing" instead of "criterion
referencing" in grading.207 Our mandatory curves and objective grading
methods have caused criterion referencing to be abandoned.0 8 With
this abandonment have gone most attempts to measure a student's
common sense or judgment, her imaginative qualities, her abilities as a
coherent or contextual thinker and writer, and even whether her exam
performance meets some basic criterion of acceptable professional per-
formance. In other words, B, C, D, and F grades today are not deter-
mined by reference to external standards of performance or profess-
ional promise, but instead are determined by the relationships between
the "points" earned by A papers and the "points" earned by all other
205. See supra text accompanying notes 105-45.
206. See discussion infra Part VI.
207. "Norm referencing" measures an individual's examination performance in relation to
the performances of other individuals on the same exam; "criterion referencing" measures exami-
nation performances by reference to external standards or criteria of desirable performance. See,
e.g., Nickles, supra note 4, at 433 n.68. These concepts are not synonymous with the concepts of
objective and Aristotelian grading methods, even though there appear to be both significant con-
ceptual overlap and a practical association between objective grading and norm referencing, on the
one hand, and Aristotelian grading and criterion referencing on the other. One could implement
norm referencing by Aristotelian methods and criterion referencing by objective methods, but
these approaches to grading would involve extra stages or steps for the grader and thus would
appear to be more complicated. In contrast, the objective grading style, which yields relative point
scores, can be used easily and directly to implement norm referencing, and the Aristotelian
method, which necessarily incorporates conceptual standards of performance, would seem to be
much more easily fitted to criterion referencing.
208. Compare Feinman & Feldman, supra note 4, at 546-47 (noting that law school grading
succeeds in ranking students along a scale, but typically provides only a limited evaluation by
means of a "minimum competence" criterion for "performance at a C level") with Nickles, supra
note 4, at 432-33, 454-59 (noting and criticizing the general absence of criterion-based standards
for evaluation of law school students) and Shaffer, supra note 184, at 192. In that article, the
author states that "American law teachers grade students according to what is called a curve. A
student's grade is not based on what he does, but on what other students do." Id. (emphasis in
original).
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papers on a particular examination. 0
This norm referencing of Blue Book exams disadvantages at least
two kinds of students. First, some students, perhaps many, are adept at
the practical skills of judgment, imagination, coherence, and contextual
thinking, but do not possess the relative quickness at issue spotting and
rule specification that Blue Book exams demand. These students will
earn law school grades that understate their abilities to practice law
effectively.21 0 Second, other students may engage quite effectively in
practical skills, but are likely to wind up at the lower end of the
mandatory curves that we apply to issue spotting Blue Book exams.21'
If these students are given failing grades in several courses simply be-
cause of their relative performance of the limited Blue Book skills and
are denied the benefit of a criterion-based judgment of their overall
knowledge and potential professional performance, these students will
be excluded from law schools and law practice systematically and
unfairly.2 12
209. See Shaffer, supra note 184, at 192 (describing pure norm referencing as the practice of
American law teachers); cf. Nickles, supra note 4, at 432-33 (reporting that as of 1975-76 only a
bare majority of law professors believed that law school exams were "criterion-referenced" and
that a substantial majority of the student leaders surveyed believed that these exams were "norm-
referenced").
210. In my anecdotal experience these students are frequently women. Cf. Teitelbaum, supra
note 78 (suggesting that women students may be disadvantaged by male-centered standardized
tests); Worden, supra note 76 (arguing that legal education disadvantages the "female voice");
Zenoff & Lorio, supra note 78, at 891-93 (describing women students' apparent underrepresenta-
tion in achieving academic honors at national law schools); see also Menkel-Meadows, Excluded
Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMi L. RE.
29, 44-48 (1987) (suggesting that "women may come to apprehend reality in different ways or ask
different questions of reality," and that "women's knowledge might contribute to different ways of
reconfiguring the legal system"); Project, Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An
Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STA. L. REv. 1209, 1248-51 (1988)
(providing some empirical evidence from Stanford women law students that supports Professor
Gilligan's thesis about the differences between "masculine" and "feminine" voices). Minority law
students, who bring a special experiential knowledge and a considerable passion for justice to their
law school classes, also may frequently be members of this disadvantaged group. See Skillman,
Misperceptions Which Operate as Barriers to the Education of Minority Law Students, 20 U.S.F.
L. Rav. 553, 556 (1986).
211. These students often include, though they are not limited to, minority students, who
frequently have been admitted to law schools with lower Law School Aptitude Test (LSAT) scores
than most of their classmates. See Romero, An Assessment of Affirmative Action in Law School
Admissions After Fifteen Years: A Need for Recommitment, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 430, 433-35 (1984).
Low LSAT scores constitute merely a statistical prediction of relatively low scores on Blue Book
exams, especially in the first year of law school, and they do not measure one's capacity or promise
for legal work. See id.; Note, Developments: Minority Attrition in Law School, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC.
144 (1987).
212. See Bell, supra note 9, at 306-09 (suggesting that the cultural background of many mi-
nority students may disadvantage them in obtaining high Blue Book grades); Skillman, supra note
210, at 556 (suggesting that the focus of minority students on specific personal goals such as social
justice may disadvantage them in a Blue Book process that requires an ability "to communicate to
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Additional disadvantages of the Blue Book system depend on how
extensively the dimensions of the law school experience carry into prac-
tice. These disadvantages include the paradigm of good paragraph
thinking; the unreflective but prevalent law school philosophy that all
law is fact and has nothing to do with values, uncertainty, interpreta-
tion, or controversy; the personal tendencies that may result from mis-
interpretations of the Blue Book experience; and the extreme deference
to authority that is taught by our Blue Book system.2 13 These disfunc-
tions, because they are so deeply and subtly ingrained by Blue Book
exams during the law school experience, may be more serious and less
remediable in practice than the disadvantages of inadequate skills
training and foregone opportunities. At the same time, these aspects of
law school mentality may result primarily from the particular social
structure of law schools and are perhaps corrected for the most part by
the different social structures of practice. At present, we do not have
adequate knowledge of the influence that law schools play on practice-
based thinking and behavior, and our judgments about the extent and
weight of these disfunctions will necessarily involve substantial uncer-
tainty. 14 Nevertheless, such judgments must be made tentatively if we
are to evaluate the modern Blue Book system in a comprehensive way.
The Blue Book system sends law graduates into the many worlds of
legal practice with several specific if implicit messages that can distort
their views of what constitutes good or high quality legal practice.
These messages also clearly influence the views of law professors about
what constitutes good teaching as well as good legal practice. These
messages include a basic notion that "rules" rather than "practical
the reader that [the student] understands the values of the legal system"); cf. Romero, supra note
211, at 434-35 (claiming that law schools should establish special programs to minimize the attri-
tion rate for minority students in order to retain students who will make competent lawyers);
Note, supra note 211, at 144 (noting that "the rate of dismissal [from law schools] is substantially
higher for minority students: 11 percent of minority students are dismissed as against 4 percent of
nonminority students").
213. See discussion supra Part IV A.
214. Compare Lortie, Laymen to Lawmen: Law School, Careers, and Professional Socializa-
tion, 29 HARV. EDUC. REv. 352, 363-67 (1959) (noting that the radical separation of theoretical law
school work from practical lawyer's work may limit the impact of law school on the socialization of
lawyers) with G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROcEss 28 (1978). Bellow & Moulton
state:
This does not mean, however, that because law schools (until quite recently) have offered very
little practical training, all professional socialization occurs in the post-J.D. years. On the
contrary, law school plays a critical role in shaping lawyers' understanding of and attitudes
towards both law and the profession. Although there has been no further development of
Lortie's hypothesis on the consequences of the radical separation of theory and practice in
law training, our hunch is that this separation renders the would-be lawyer more vulnerable
to the socializing forces of both law school and practice.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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judgments" solve problems21 5 and, more subtly, a notion that "legal
analysis" requires strict adherence to a careful, precise, and comprehen-
sive analysis of legal forms and objective authorities that avoids gen-
eral, more abstract, more imaginative, and "nonlegal" considerations.216
These messages also promote the idea that quickness, precision,
and correctness are the proper ideals for all lawyerly pursuits; this idea
diminishes other ideals such as reflection, deliberative action, imagina-
tive analogy, general principles, and tentative or risk-taking behavior.
Law students also learn from the Blue Book experience that profession-
alism entails an abject deference toward principles bearing the marks of
professional authority; in other words, that quick, narrow, precise
thinking which fits the context of a superior authority is the way to
obtain access to personal opportunities and the applause of others.1
Above all, each of these messages is consistent with, supportive of, and
integrated by the paradigm of good paragraph thinking. Because this
paradigm has earned new lawyers access to their profession, it seems
likely that many lawyers may remain attached to this paradigm in order
to earn subsequent professional rewards as well.21 "
The implicit messages of Blue Book exams may dissipate after law
school as lawyers respond to the different social structures of work in
the world of legal practice. Lawyers may respond to their new settings
in different ways. The best lawyers will abandon or modify the implicit
messages of Blue Books as they begin to deal with the complex require-
ments of practical judgment, interpretive methods, value conflicts, un-
certainties, and the inherent controversies of legal practices.219 Other,
less fortunate practitioners may cope by adopting relatively rigid, work-
oriented views that serve the practical requirements of their particular
practice but limit their overall legal capabilities. For example, office
215. Cf. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 45, at 162-68 (describing rule-oriented lec-
turing in the modern law school classroom); Cramton, supra note 4, at 328 (stating that the law
school curriculum "is too much of one piece in method, pace, and content: the dissection of appel-
late cases, two or three per hour, at that intermediate level of abstraction that focuses on rules and
process"); Watson, supra note 92, at 107-08 (noting that the limited practice experience of law
professors, which often has focused around a judicial clerkship, promotes a classroom focus on
doctrinal abstractions). See generally Lehman, supra note 40 (analyzing the interrelated roles of
rules and practical judgment in adjudication).
216. See discussion supra Part I.
217. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
218. Cf. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF ScmNTipic REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) (arguing that
scientific paradigms are the major scientific achievements that research communities accept, often
implicitly, as the basis for future scientific research; these paradigms, however, constrain the be-
havior of researchers and can generate substantial if irrational resistance to new ideas and achieve-
ments that fall outside the scope of the prevailing paradigm).
219. Cf. D. SCHON, supra note 87, at 14-18; Amsterdam, supra note 65, at 613-15; Pipkin,
supra note 120, at 250-52 (noting that professional practice demands involvement with value con-
flicts, uncertainty, and controversy).
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counselors may evolve into strict formalists who believe that the law
consists only of certain rules, but recognize the complexity of fact situa-
tions and the need in some cases to make complex and controversial
arguments.2 ° Many litigators, on the other hand, may become rather
strict legal realists who do not believe in legal rules at all.22' A third
group of lawyers simply follow the messages of Blue Books in their
practices, muscling ahead on the authority of professional expertise and
benefiting from society's tendency to defer to this idea. These lawyers
and their clients may be the most unfortunate victims of the Blue Book
experience.
Each reader must draw her own conclusions about the overall val-
ues of our current Blue Book system. In my view, the alleged benefits
are greatly overstated and, significantly, can be obtained by alternative
techniques that allow for better educational practices. Thus, the disad-
vantages of Blue Book exams substantially outweigh their alleged bene-
fits. Part VI suggests several modifications to the current Blue Book
system.
VI. CHANGE
This Part describes a series of cumulative changes to our teaching
and examination practices that could mitigate the adverse effects of the
current Blue Book system. A few changes may require institutional de-
cisions or commitments, and many clearly would benefit from institu-
tional support. Most of these reforms, however, may be implemented by
individual teachers. The changes prescribed are thus reforms of a rela-
tively modest nature. From another perspective, each of these proposals
calls for creating preclinical or quasi-clinical teaching methods that may
be used in the relatively large classes of American law schools. Even in
these classes, we can and should be teaching and examining for profes-
sional attributes and skills instead of teaching merely to measure our
students' relative examination productivity and self-learning capacities.
These changes could promote a healthy measure of intellectual plu-
ralism in legal education, and more specifically they would help to im-
plement four improvements in legal education. First, conventional legal
analysis, or the Blue Book skills, could be taught more effectively
through a combination of writing exercises, practice by students, and
supervised feedback to students on their performance of these skills.
Second, providing increased opportunities for students to engage in
220. Cf. Lehman, The Influence of the Universities on Judicial Decision, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 1,
2 (1924) (stating that "[t]he lawyer in this practice deals with concrete cases ... [h]e seeks pri-
marily certainty in law, so he can advise his client what his legal rights and obligations are").
221. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 265.
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writing would develop their abilities to present a coherent discourse, in
contrast to the Case Analysis/Blue Book paradigm of good paragraph
thinking. Third, we should increase our attention to context and theo-
retical matters that lie behind or beyond doctrine-go "beyond
cases"-in both the classroom and in student writings and examina-
tions.222 Fourth, we should engage in preclinical and quasi-clinical
teaching to help prepare our students to work with the clinical skills of
fact investigations, interviewing, counseling and negotiation, interpreta-
tion, client planning, and advocacy.
22 1
A. Practice and Feedback
If the Blue Book skills of issue identification, specification of rules,
and the application of rules to complex facts are valuable legal skills,
the teachers of doctrinal courses should be providing more instruction,
more practice, and individualized feedback on student writing that em-
ploys these skills in different doctrinal areas. 24 Many writing exercises
are possible, but one direct method is simply to ask students several
times a semester to write short ungraded essays (or outlines of essays)
based on old examination problems that cover the same issues the stu-
dents will face on the final exam.2 Individualized feedback can be pro-
vided by a combination of methods that need not unduly tax law school
or professorial resources. These methods might include class discussions
of the problems; written self-critiques by students after class discussion;
peer review of students' work; a review of student essays, outlines, and
self-critiques by teaching assistants (if money is available to hire assist-
ants); and cursory reviews of some of the written work by faculty mem-
bers to ensure that their students and teaching assistants are working
generally in the right direction. 26
Law professors traditionally object to offering these sorts of writing
exercises because of the large classes at American law schools and the
222. See generally Lindgren, Beyond Cases: Reconsidering Judicial Review, 1983 Wis. L.
REv. 583; Luban, supra note 184; Macaulay, supra note 17, at 534-42; Michelman, The Parts and
the Whole: Non-Euclidean Curricular Geometry, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 352 (1982).
223. See generally Amsterdam, supra note 65. I owe this point to Marina Angel of Temple
Law School.
224. See Feinman & Feldman, supra note 4; Motley, supra note 4, at 747-60.
225. I have employed this technique in teaching Constitutional Law to upper-class students
and Criminal Procedure to first-year students with apparent success. See Bean, supra note 131;
Kahn, supra note 131; Kissam, supra note 8, at 164-68 (describing and recommending the use of
short, ungraded writing exercises to help teach doctrinal courses).
226. On the educational values of employing law student teaching assistants in legal educa-
tion, see Trakman, Law Student Teachers: An Untapped Resource, 30 J. LEGAL EDuc. 331 (1979).
On the need to employ teaching assistants to institutionalize educational reforms in law schools,
see Feinnan, Change in Law Schools, 16 N.M.L. REv. 505, 506-07 (1986); Kissam, supra note 8, at
165.
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consequent cost of faculty time that would be devoted to writing super-
vision. As outlined, however, this proposal does not require a significant
commitment of faculty time, and any resistance to this kind of teaching
in law schools can only be justified on other grounds. I can think of four
sources of resistance. First, many faculty may be unwilling to delegate
their teaching function to teaching assistants or to students themselves,
even though much student learning occurs in any event without faculty
227supervision.  Second, many faculty may sense, at least implicitly, that
extended practice and feedback on Blue Book skills will reveal the basic
source of their expertise for what it really is: a process that is not terri-
bly complicated or intellectually sophisticated, even if its effective per-
formance requires experience, practice, and repetition along with
common sense, practical judgment, and a talent for nuance.22 s Third,
many faculty may sense correctly that much practice for and feedback
to students on these basic skills will make it more difficult to impose
the school's mandatory grading curve on final exam papers.229 Finally,
law faculty may sense, again correctly, that providing midterm criticism
of the students' individual written work may have adverse effects on
the students' subsequent formal evaluations of the professor's teaching,
an evaluation that typically occurs right before law students write and
are graded on their Blue Book exams.230
The first two factors are matters of false professional pride and
should not be allowed to obstruct reasonable educational reforms.231
Faculty concern about their execution of mandatory grading curves is a
more substantial problem for the implementation of exam practice and
feedback. This concern could be alleviated, however, by a law school's
decision to modify the harsher aspects of its grading curve for classes in
which writing exercises are employed.23 2 Perhaps the mandatory curve
could be modified substantially for all upper-class courses, for by this
time class ranks have been established and grades are no longer as im-
227. See Kissam, supra note 8, at 165-66.
228. See D. KENNEDY, supra note 103, at 26-28.
229. See Feinman & Feldman, supra note 51, at 924-30; Kissam, supra note 8, at 162-63;
Roberts, supra note 85, at 224.
230. See Kissam, supra note 8, at 148-49. On the nature and use of student evaluations in
law schools, see Roth, Student Evaluation of Law Teaching, 17 AKRON L. Rav. 609 (1984). On the
importance of these evaluations to the work and careers of at least some law professors, see Kis-
sam, supra note 3, at 272-75, and Harvard Professor Protests Colleagues' Tenure Denials, N.Y.
Times, June 9, 1987, at A-14, col. 2 (quoting Robert Clark of Harvard Law School on the denial of
tenure to two critical legal studies professors: "Neither of those people were very good teachers
... [b]oth were among the bottom ten percent in student ratings").
231. See Kissam, supra note 8, at 165-66.
232. Cf. id. at 162-63 (recommending that mandatory grading curves be modified to accom-
modate general use of take-home examinations as a means of promoting better education).
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portant for their material consequences."' In any event, a mandatory
curve can be imposed on almost any kind of written performance, espe-
cially time-limited Blue Book exams, even if the quality of student per-
formance is improved overall by practice and feedback. While it does
seem unfair to give the same low grades for better performances, law
students will be better off with increased learning from practice and
feedback. Finally, faculty concerns about adverse effects on student
evaluations of their teaching is understandable. These concerns could
be alleviated by an institutional decision to individualize the student
evaluations of teachers, which would avoid imposing bad teaching prac-
tices on students because of bureaucratic accountability.3 4 n any event,
individual teachers, especially if tenured and experienced, should be
able to get around this obstacle at little permanent cost.
B. Different Grading Practices
Three changes to grading practices could help alleviate the bad ef-
fects of our current Blue Book system. First, law schools should revise
their grading scales to reduce the number of required distinctions in the
grades of individual courses, or they at least should modify these scales
for courses in which writing exercises are employed in addition to or
instead of Blue Books. This change would encourage the use of writing
exercises, either as practice for Blue Book exams or as alternative
graded work, because faculty members no longer would be required to
impose so many different grade distinctions upon the evaluated work of
their students."'
Second, law schools should revise their mandatory grading curves,
either for all classes or for those in which significant writing exercises
are used, in order to allow higher grades and more flexible grading pat-
terns. This modification would also encourage the use of writing exer-
cises because faculty members no longer would be required to impose as
many low grades on the individual written work of students, which is
generally more coherent than Blue Book essays written by the same
students. 86 In addition, more flexible and more humane grading curves
could help faculty members to correct the common misinterpretation
by students that law school grades are an authoritative measure of their
professional promise and personal worth. 37 This proposal does not re-
233. See Cramton, supra note 4, at 328-29 (noting that first-year grades control the distribu-
tion of law school "goodies").
234. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 310.
235. See supra text accompanying note 229.
236. See Kissam, supra note 8, at 163.
237. See supra Part IV A (describing student misinterpretation of grades as indicators of
professional quality).
[Vol. 42:433
LAW SCHOOL EXAMINATIONS
quire that every student receive an A or that class ranks be abolished.
It only suggests that law schools examine the reasons for their current
grading curves, which often limit the "good" grades to less than half of
all grades. Law schools may wish to consider whether something like
the Harvard model of twenty percent As, sixty percent Bs, and twenty
percent Cs s8 or the more flexible grading patterns at other national
schools '39 would not make sense as a more adequate mechanism of self-
regulation that allows for more writing by students and more diverse
teaching practices.
Third, individual faculty members should consider switching from
objective grading methods to an Aristotelian style of reading and evalu-
ating student written work. This change could promote better student
writing and more learning-by-writing; it also would make reading tradi-
tional Blue Book essays a more enjoyable and informative process for
faculty. The Aristotelian style of reading and evaluating student written
work already is employed in law school clinics.240 This style is appropri-
ate for reading and evaluating seminar papers because the Aristotelian
approach, especially when used with ungraded first drafts, is more
likely to elicit creative work by students and helpful, creative commen-
tary from faculty.241 Might not many of these same benefits, though in
different forms, accrue from applying the Aristotelian method to Blue
Book exams as well?
Thus, the Aristotelian approach should be extended to reading fi-
nal examinations in doctrinal courses, whether these are Blue Book es-
says, take-home examinations of extended duration, or other kinds of
student writing. If students know that their work will be evaluated by
the same standards that are applied in clinics, seminars, and legal prac-
tice, they are more likely to think and write in an organized, imagina-
tive, and critical way. Furthermore, the Aristotelian approach to
grading exams is likely to be more enjoyable for the faculty member,
more informative about the potential qualities of our students, and
more generative of feedback to students about how they might improve
238. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
239. For example, Boalt Hall, Buffalo, and Yale law schools have developed grading systems
that have reduced the number of grading categories. See 81 BOALT HALL, ANNOUNCEMENT FOR EN-
TERING STUDENTS, at 9 (Sept. 1988) (High Honors, Honors, Pass and Fail grades); STATE UNIVER-
SITY OF NEW YORK AT BUFFALO, FACULTY OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 1986-88 BULLETIN, at 8 (1988)
(Honors, Qualified, Marginal, and Fail grades); YALE LAW SCHOOL, INFORMATION AND APPLICATION
FORMS FOR CLASS ENTERING SEPTEMER 1988, at 2 (1988) (Credit/Fail grading first semester; Hon-
ors, High Pass, Pass, and Fail grades thereafter).
240. See, e.g., Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and Imple-
mentation, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 132-34 (1979); Carr, Grading Clinic Students, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC.
223, 225-27 (1974); Klineberg & Barnes, supra note 101, at 27-29, 40-42.
241. See Kissam, supra note 8, at 168-70.
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their future performance of the examination functions. 24 2 Of course, a
switch to an Aristotelian grading style would be enhanced considerably
if the proposed changes to grading scales and mandatory curves are im-
plemented because these changes would alleviate the professor's need to
impose many grade distinctions, which invite the use of objective grad-
ing methods. This reform, however, is quite possibly within the reach of
many faculty members who could change their grading styles without
any institutional support or endorsement.
Critics will raise the objection, of course, that Aristotelian grading
is less consistent in application and thus unfair to individual students.
Critics also will complain that grades under this method are more diffi-
cult to explain. Aristotelian grading might take additional time to ex-
plain,24 but law professors in general do not seem to have much trouble
justifying their grades on seminar papers or clinical work, so why
should we avoid this grading process elsewhere? This analysis does sug-
gest that Aristotelian methods mights be employed more easily in up-
per-class courses, at least initially, especially if faculty members grade
in this fashion without explicit institutional endorsement. Still, if the
Aristotelian method of grading is accompanied by changes in the teach-
ing focus, examination questions, and types of examinations in upper-
class courses, even this limited change could do much to improve the
nature of legal education.
C. Different Kinds of Questions
With these proposed reforms in place, especially those of practice,
feedback, and Aristotelian grading, law professors would be in a better
position to experiment and diversify with different kinds of examina-
tion questions. While some diversification already is taking place, 4 the
proposed reforms would help law professors understand the purposes
and values of different examination questions. The proposed reforms
also would help professors explain the purposes and values of different
examination questions to their students.
First, law professors probably should be using more rather than
fewer short-answer questions on traditional Blue Book exams. In the
1920s Professor Benjamin Wood demonstrated at Columbia Law School
how the examination purposes of the Columbia law faculty could be
242. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
243. The best way to explain grades under the Aristotelian method might be to send short
letters to each student outlining the examiner's application of the standards of professional per-
formance to the examination. Cf. Kissam, supra note 8, at 169 n.96 (recommending Elaine Mal-
mon's idea of using letters or some other written critique to explain grades on final versions of
student papers after a student and professor have collaborated on initial stages of the work).
244. See Macdonald, supra note 15, at 569-70.
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achieved more effectively and students graded more consistently by the
use of well-designed short-answer questions in place of the traditional
Blue Book essay.2 5 The modern Blue Book exam's focus on testing for
just three functions-issue spotting, rule specification, and rule applica-
tion-seems ideally suited for short-answer questions because this focus
apparently is narrower than the examination purposes of the Columbia
law faculty in the 1920s.24 Furthermore, short-answer Blue Book exams
are better suited for comprehensive testing of the many doctrinal rules
that modern professors encourage their students to learn.
Of course, a traditional objection to short-answer questions is that
law faculty do not have the expertise to construct well-designed ques-
tions that can test for complex issue spotting and analysis.4 This same
lack of expertise, however, may apply to designing essay questions as
well.24 8 Moreover, if short-answer questions to test for a comprehensive
knowledge of doctrine were accompanied by the use of non-Blue Book
writing exercises to test students on complex analysis,24 9 professors
would not have to worry as much about the consequences of inept
short-answer questionmaking.
Second, if Blue Book essays are employed, the Aristotelian grading
style would allow the professor to contemplate many different kinds of
questions for exams in doctrinal courses. For example, given flexibility
in evaluating Blue Books, law faculty members should be willing to cre-
ate a broader range of questions concerning the exposition and inter-
pretation of complex authority, the construction of complex legal
arguments, counseling and planning issues, ethical issues, and legal the-
ory.250 To be sure, the time constraints of Blue Book exams will limit
the quality of student responses to these questions, but the students
will have learned more about these broader issues from their review
process (and perhaps from their writing Blue Book exams) than they
currently do under a system that is so heavily oriented towards Blue
Book objectivism.251
245. Wood (pts. 1-3), supra note 4.
246. Compare id. (pt. 1), at 226-34 (describing the examination purposes at Columbia in the
1920s) with discussion supra Part II (describing contemporary examination purposes in law
schools).
247. See supra text accompanying note 54.
248. See Nickles, supra note 4, at 443-51.
249. See discussion infra Part VI D.
250. See Macdonald, supra note 15, at 570.
251. Cf. Berthoff, L.A. Richards, in TRADrrIONS OF INQUIRY 50, 52 (J. Brereton ed. 1985) (sug-
gesting that "[i]ndeed, the old formula-students can only write as well as they can read-may be
reversed as teachers come to understand what it means to say that writing is a mode of learning
students can read only as well as they can write" (emphasis in original)); Kissam, supra note 8, at
140-41 (describing the learning process that can occur in the course of serious writing). In other
words, if we change what students must write on Blue Books, we may be able to change the ways
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Third, law school professors should consider giving their students
choices of questions on which to write. This reform has two advantages.
The professional promise of students could be assessed on the basis of
their relative strengths and interests in a particular subject. Perhaps
more significantly, the faculty member's interest in reading and evalu-
ating student answers might be maintained by reading essays on the
different subjects that her students choose to address. If tedium and
boredom are relieved, professors might become more insightful and
helpful examination readers, as well as more enthusiastic teachers and
persons.5 2
D. Different Sorts of Examinations
The most important changes to educational practices would be
achieved by diversifying the kinds of student writing that we evaluate
in basic doctrinal courses. Blue Books at best constitute a very limited
form of instrumental writing. 53 The severe time constraints require one
to transfer immediate thoughts directly to printed or written form, with
little or no opportunity for the writer to reflect on and obtain creative
feedback from partial writings as in a more complete and serious writ-
ing process. Further, as a consequence of this instrumental quality,
Blue Books encourage the paradigm of good paragraph thinking as the
only way to think about the law, the legal process, and legal analysis.
These limitations of Blue Book exams could be mitigated by requiring
alternative kinds of student writing in basic courses.
Take-home examinations of extended duration, ideally of two or
three days (in some cases perhaps longer), would provide a better edu-
cational experience for learning analytical skills and at least some kinds
of legal doctrine.24 This kind of writing also should provide readers
with essays that are much better organized than Blue Book essays, and
thus the reader is more likely to develop a favorable assessment of the
students' general potential as practicing lawyers. Of course, the evalua-
tion of take-home questions that approximate Blue Book questions is
more difficult to fit into a a grading curve with many gradations, and
some institutional reform of a school's grading scale and grading curve
may be necessary or helpful.
In addition, law professors should consider evaluating students in
basic doctrinal courses by combining traditional Blue Book evaluation
with clinic or seminar evaluation. In other words, professors might com-
in which they read and learn in their daily study and reviews, if not in the exam writing itself.
252. See discussion supra Part IV B.
253. See Kissam, supra note 8, at 138-39, 143.
254. Id. at 158-63.
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bine relatively short (one- or two-hour) short-answer final exams with
requirements that students also write short papers, short research
memorandums, or short take-home essays on assigned questions. This
combination of evaluative methods would provide the traditional Blue
Book value of covering doctrine while offering many of the educational
advantages of take-home examinations. Of course, this change, like my
proposal for take-home exams, could be accomplished more easily if the
proposed reforms to grading practices were already in place.
E. A Note on Teaching Styles and Materials
The use of exams to help teach and examine discourse writing, le-
gal theory, and clinical skills should be accompanied by changes in
classroom teaching styles and philosophies. As professors experiment
with new approaches to teaching the mainstream subjects of American
law, we will need to rethink the regulatory style of our so-called So-
cratic dialogues,55 our extensive "Socratic monologues" or disguised
case lectures,5 6 and our pure text-bound lecturing on the many com-
plex aspects of contemporary doctrine.2 7 Instead, different kinds of lec-
tures, different sorts of conversations,2 5  and, importantly, different
types of reading materials259 will become appropriate and necessary to
255. On the regulatory style of our classroom dialogues, see T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT,
supra note 45, at 162-68; Dillon, Paper Chase and the Socratic Method of Teaching Law, 30 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 529 (1980); Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REv. L. & Soc.
ACTION 71 (1970); Savoy, Toward A New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 457-60
(1970); Watson, supra note 92, at 119-32.
256. See Cramton, supra note 4, at 328 (describing the "Socratic monologue" or "avuncular
Socratic method").
257. See T. SHAFFER & 1R REDMOUNT, supra note 45, at 162-68.
258. See Calleros, Variations on the Problem Method in First-Year and Upper-Division
Classes, 20 U.S.F. L. RE V. 455 (1986) (suggesting assignment and discussion of periodic review
problems); Cole, The Socratic Method in Legal Education: Moral Discourse and Accommodation,
35 MERCER L. REv. 867 (1984) (advancing a conception of the Socratic method as a "moral educa-
tion"); Kahn, supra note 131 (suggesting research writing problems and small group discussions to
teach doctrine in large classes); Feinman & Feldman, supra note 4, at 537-44 (suggesting a mix of
lectures, small group sessions, practice problems, and mastery learning examination techniques to
help teach contracts and tort law); Menkel-Meadow, Women as Law Teachers: Toward the "Femi-
nization" of Legal Education, in ESSAYS ON THE APPLICATION OF A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE TO LAW
TEACHING 16, 22 (1981) (characterizing her classroom style as the production of a "tossed salad" of
ideas from different persons in the classroom); Stone, supra note 71, at 406-18 (describing educa-
tional problems with the rigorous or regulatory use of the Socratic method, which is destructive
and not constructive of moral values; noting potential dangers in a mere "permissive" use of the
Socratic method; and suggesting that faculty members bring some of their "firm ideological posi-
tions" from scholarship into the classroom and that they organize "student projects which promote
cooperation, which allow self-selection, which test value orientations, [and] which permit students
to make use of relevant expertise they already possess").
259. See Kissam, supra note 3, at 303-07; Laycock, Reflections on Two Themes: Teaching
Religious Liberty and Evolutionary Changes in Casebooks (Book Review), 101 HARv. L. RE V. 1642,
1652-55 (1988).
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legal education. In other words, if we want law students to engage sub-
stantially in a process of coherent and contextual thinking and writing,
then both our reading materials and classroom efforts must become
more coherent and contextual in order to support our general purposes.
This is not the place to speculate about these experiments, but at a
minimum professors will need to develop and employ coherent texts.
We also will need to develop a new ethic under which law students will
be responsible for learning themselves by reading these texts. We must
prepare students to be examined on this learning even if the material
has not been covered in a law school classroom. 60 In other words, we
must move away from the discipline of many classroom hours and the
ideal that all learning must be centered around what the professor says.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Blue Book world depicted in these pages should be changed,
yet it will be difficult to make effective changes primarily because of the
vested interests, false consciousness, and easy rationalizations that also
have been described. How, then, might one persuade others to engage
in effective changes?
Professor Richard Rorty has argued recently that much philosophi-
cal enterprise consists of attempts to persuade others to change their
ways of thinking and acting by inventing new metaphors, new lan-
guages, and new perspectives about old subjects, even though these new
ideas and concepts must inevitably be built upon and constrained by
the older languages, perspectives, and interests.26' Perhaps one could do
this with Blue Book exams by suggesting new metaphors to describe
our current predicament.
In one view, the contemporary Blue Book system may be seen as a
manifestation of the increasing commercialization of the legal profes-
sion. The dramatic expansion of corporate law firms in the past two
decades, which seems to result from economic needs to serve complex
clients and provide specialized legal services, 6 ' has imposed new pres-
sures on law school examination and grading practices. First, the needs
of large firms for young associates who are capable of performing com-
plex but routine cognitive work with limited supervision from more ex-
260. See supra note 142; see also Laycock, supra note 259, at 1655; cf. Berthoff, supra note
251, at 52 (suggesting that if students are required to write they may begin to read in a critical
fashion).
261. Rorty, The Contingency of Community, LONDON REV. BOOKS, July 24, 1986, at 10-14;
Rorty, The Contingency of Selfhood, LONDoN RE V. BooKs, May 8, 1986, at 11-16; Rorty, The Con-
tingency of Language, LONDON REV. BOOKS, April 17, 1986, at 3-6.
262. See Jones, The Challenge of Change: The Practice of Law in the Year 2000, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 683, 684-88 (1988).
[Vol. 42:433
LAW SCHOOL EXAMINATIONS
perienced lawyers presumably has increased geometrically. This need,
of course, has increased the demand by these firms for associates who
have demonstrated a capacity and talent for productivity and self-
learning, which Blue Books measure best. Second, the creation of the
megafirm also has caused many firms to expand their interviewing to
regional and local law schools that previously had sent only a few stu-
dents to large corporate firms. Although these schools still may send
only a fraction of their students into the corporate world, unlike na-
tional law schools,2 63 these schools must now generate disaggregated
class ranks that measure productivity and self-learning in order to serve
the basic interests of the large firms and students who are interested in
working for these firms. But commercialization of many law firms need
not and should not produce a parallel commercialization of legal educa-
tion. To let this happen would be to let our. public interests be har-
nessed by the private interests of the few: the large corporate firm and
those who work in this environment.2 '4
In another view, one of longer duration, our contemporary Blue
Book system may be seen as the ultimate development of a classical law
school discipline. From the perspective of Michel Foucault, the Blue
Book system works with an admirable or terrible rationality to super-
vise the minute details of law student lives in order to transform our
students into productive and subjected bodies-in other words, a "use-
ful force." ' 5 Like the eighteenth-century inventions of military bar-
racks, factory workplaces, and the modern school, the classical
discipline of law schools results from an attempt to supervise almost
everything about our students' lives and thoughts through long reading
assignments; many carefully timed class hours per week; the amphithe-
ater classroom; our close and skeptical questioning; and a competitive
examination system with its puzzling and fragmentary contexts of
casebooks, treatises, and many-layered discussions. We probably cannot
avoid discipline in the modern university, and any discipline will have
its dark sides.2'6 But the classical discipline manifest in our Blue Book
system does seem unnecessarily harsh and inhumane, and we should
strive instead to develop pluralistic disciplines within university law
schools.
263. See Bok Assails Gaps in Pay in Vital Jobs, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1988, at A16, col. 3
(reporting Derek Bok's 1988 commencement address in which he stated that 96% of Harvard law
graduates enter private law firms).
264. Cf. R. LUSTIG, CoRPoRATE LiBERALIsht THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL
THEORY 1890-1920, at 7-12 (1982) (claiming that the modem corporate organization harnesses pub-
lic interests for the private interests of the few).
265. See M. FOUCAULT, DIsCIPLINE, supra note 2, at 26, 135-228.
266. See generally X. FOUCAULT, Two Lectures, supra note 2.
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Finally, let us consider the metaphor of community and the ethics
of our responsibilities to different communities.267 The law professor,
intentionally or not, assumes responsibilities to one or more of several
personal and professional communities. These communities include our
students; sectors of the legal profession such as corporate firms, small
general practices, or the criminal defense bar; the law school or univer-
sity; and broader social groups as well. This analysis of Blue Book ex-
ams suggests that there is a serious and inappropriate imbalance in
professorial service to these various communities, and that this imbal-
ance has been constructed by our unthinking adherence to a conserva-
tive examination system. The present Blue Book system serves mainly
corporate law firms and their clients, and it may serve these interests in
less than optimal fashion. Perhaps we can change this system if we try
to think more as teachers rather than scholars and attend to our proxi-
mate community-the community of all students, their interests, and
the varied social groups to which our students and our profession can
and must relate.268
267. See Shaffer, supra note 184 (contrasting Aristotelian, Kantian, and Buberian ap-
proaches to ethics and recommending that an ethics of relationships with others and with commu-
nities, which may be derived from the work of Martin Buber and H. Richard Niebuhr, should be
applied to questions of law school ethics); cf. C. GILLGAN, supra note 76; Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 210, at 44-49 (suggesting that women in general may approach the resolution of ethical and
legal issues in a more contextual and more interdependent fashion than men).
268. See Savoy, supra note 255, at 447-48. He states:
For myself, the only way to grow is to take risks and experiment..
If any real learning is to go on in our schools (and I take it that is what we are all
concerned about), then our first responsibility must be to the human beings who live in our
academic house, not to the Bar, or the profession, or the alumni.
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